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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, world attention
has been increasingly focused on the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation.
When the USSR ceased to exist, four former Soviet Republics suddenly
emerged on the international scene as potential nuclear weapons-capable
states: Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. This event represented an
enormous challenge to international arms control efforts as well as to the
very existence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. As a result,
Western and U.S. non-proliferation energies have been galvanized around
status quo maintenance of the NPT regime. U.S. foreign policy, in both the
Bush and Clinton administrations, centered on denuclearization of all former
Soviet republics except for Russia. This policy was based on the premise that
the periphery states of Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were politically
unstable, unknown quantities which had little experience with large-scale
nuclear operations. Relatively more stable and the center of the former
Soviet Union, Russia was considered the natural and only legitimate nuclear
inheritor of the Soviet Union.
Yet concerns over nuclear non-proliferation are not limited to the
geography of the Former Soviet Union, and in fact have multiplied since the
beginning of this year. International attention is currently riveted upon
North Korea's nuclear operations. Western intelligence agencies believe that
North Korea is either in the final stages of developing nuclear weapons or is
viii
adding to its arsenal. At this time the Clinton Administration is proposing
heavy international economic sanctions upon North Korea unless it permits
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and backs away from
nuclear weapons construction. North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung has
responded by declaring that any form of sanctions would be considered and
act of war. Seoul has mobilized its military reserves.
Others are more sanguine about the crisis. Some South Koreans do not
believe that Kim Il-Sung would ever strike the South with nuclear weapons
even if he did possess them. In the U.S., long-time Asian scholar Claude Buss
is also more concerned with intent rather than the existence of nuclear
weapons: he doubts that Kim would push the button. It is precisely at this
point in the debate over North Korea, or Ukraine, or any new nuclear state
for that mater, where this thesis intervenes. The question to be asked is this:
Do the C2 systems of new nuclear states contain hidden vulnerabilities
which, when strained by crisis, may cause the system to fail: And if they fail,
would it adversely effect regional or international stability?
Whether it is North Korea today, Ukraine tomorrow or possibly Iran
next week, the point is not to be pessimistic or optimistic about nuclear
proliferation but to be practical. Leaders of new nuclear states may not want
to deploy their arsenals; they may want them strictly for reasons of prestige
and politics. The nuclear C2 systems themselves, however, may fail at a
critical moment and escalate a crisis into a nuclear exhange. This would
destroy regional or international stability.
This thesis addresses the likelihood that nuclear C2 structures in new
nuclear states contain inherent vulnerabilities which, when the system is
ix
placed under stress, will cause it to fail. The thesis will demonstrate that C2
vulnerabilities and potential failures have definite impacts upon regional
and international stability. As information on C2 systems in new nuclear
states is extremely limited, a general deductive framework for analysis will be
put forward. To highlight the relevance of the topic, Ukraine is the specific
case study upon which the general framework will be overlaid, to try to
determine what form its C2 system would take along with the corresponding
implications for stability. It will be demonstrated that a similar evaluation
could be performed on any new or potential nuclear state.
This thesis makes several conslusions. First, command and control
systems themselves are at the hart of the arguments surrounding nuclear
proliferation. Second, command and control systems are therefore the keys to
stability in new nuclear states. Third, analytical tools are required to unmask
the obscure command and control systems in these states. Such tools may
also identify specific vulnerabilities inherent in the command and control
systems of new nucleaar states. Fourth, Ukraine's nuclear command and
control system, if it exists, is likely to fail, should a crisis develop. If a failure
ocurred, it would likely result in the use or detonation of a nuclear weapon;
such a failure is termed "deadly." Finally, this thesis suggests that the U.S.
government reconsider efforts to assist new nuclear states attain safe, secure
and reliable nuclear forces.
x
1. INTRODUCTION
Since the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991, world attention has become
focused on nuclear weapons proliferation. When the USSR ceased to exist. four former
Soviet Republics suddenly emerged as potential nuclear wveapons-capable states: Russia.
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. This event represented an enormous challenge to
nuclear arms control agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union as well as to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 1 U.S. foreign policy, in hnth the Bush and
Clinton administrations, centered on denuclearization of all former Soviet republics
except for Russia. This policy was based on the premise that the periphery states of
Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan were politically unstable, unknown quantities which
had little experience with large-scale nuck - operations. 2 Russia, having been the center
of the Soviet Union and considered relatively more stable, came to be viewed by
Washington as the only legitimate nuclear inheritor of the Soviet Union. 3
Efforts to this end have been marginally successful: Belarus and Kazakhstan have
agreed to divest themselves of their nuclear arsenals and will join the NPT as non-nuclear
weapons states. Ukraine, however, has only recently agreed to adhere to the NPT and
1 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT is an internationally ratified document which stipulates
that only five states may possess nuclear weapons: the U.S., Russia, China. France and the UK. It is due
for re-ratification in 1995.
2 Kurt M. Campbell. Ashton B. Carter, Steven E. Miller and Charles A. Zraket, Soviet Nuclear Fission:
Control of the Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegratine Soviet Union, (Cambridge, Mass: Center for Science
and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1991).
3 Interview with U.S. Ambassador to Russia Strobe Talbot in Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 20. No. 8, 7
August 1993. Also see Campbell, et. al., Soviet Nuclear Fission.
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begun to turn ovet elements of its strategic nuclear arsenal to Russia for dismantlement
(due to end in 1997).4 This process does not promise to be easy considering both the
internal and external threats to Ukraine's survival.
Yet concerns over nuclear proliferation are not limited to the newly independent
states of the Former Soviet Union, and in fact have multiplied since the beginning of this
year. International attention is currently riveted upon North Korea's nuclear operations.
Western intelligence agencies believe that North Korea is either in the final stages of
developing nuclear weapons or is adding to its arsenal. 5 Recently the Clinton
Administration considered heavy international economic sanctions upon North Korea
unless it permited International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and backed
away from nuclear weapons construction. 6 North Korean leader Kim 11-Sung, having
originally responded by declaring that any form of sanctions would be considered an act
of war, has now agreed to U.S. demands. 7
Others are more sanguine about the crisis. Some South Koreans do not believe that
Kim I1-Sung would ever strike the South with nuclear weapons even if he did possess
them.8 In the U.S., long-time Asian scholar Claude Buss is also more concerned with
intent rather than the existence of nuclear weapons: he doubts that Kim would push the
button. 9 The intent to use nuclear weapons is certainly an aspect of proliferation not to
4 Under terms of the Trilateral Statement, signed by Ukrainian President Kruvchuk in January 1994 and
ratified by the Ukrainian Rada in February, Ukraine is to denuclearize by 1997 in return for financial
compensation and international security guarantees.
5David E. Sanger. "The Pyongyang Puzzle," New York Times, 1 June 1994, Al.
61David E Sanger, "Tokyo Reluctant to Endorse Sanctions," New York Times, 9 June 1994, Al.
71bid.
8 David E. Sanger, -South Korea Worries Transcend Bomb," ,Ne Yokim.•, 12 June 1994, A6.
9Interview, 10 June 1994.
2
be overlooked. However, while much attention has focused on the development and
possession of nuclear weapons themselves, little has concentrated on the systems used to
command and control them. It is precisely at this point in the debate over North Korea.
or Ukraine, or any other new nuclear state, where this thesis intervenes. The question to
be asked is this: Do the command and control systems of new nuclear states contain
hidden vulnerabilities which, when strained by crisis, may cause the system to fail. An
attendant question is, if they fail, what might be the impact upon regional or international
stability'? This thesis proposes that there exists a relationship between the nuclear
command and control systems in new nuclear states and stability. Stability is defined for
the purpose of this thesis as the absence of military conflict between states. Should
nuclear command and control systems fail, through accidental or inadvertent weapon
employment or detonation, regional and international tensions are very likely to escalate
beyond the control of deplomacy and mediation.
To portray the relationship between a new nuclear state's command and control
system and stability, it is useful to consider the following scenario: over the next several
weeks diplomatic talks between the U.S. and North Korea falter and tensions on the
Korean peninsula continue to mount. Suddenly a massive explosion near the Yongbvon
nuclear complex in North Korea is detected by U.S. and South Korean intelligence
systems. Perceiving this to have been an accidental nuclear detonation of a warhead in
transit to its delivery vehicle, the U.S. and South Koreans launch a surgical air strike
against the North. Kim Il-Sung, believing that the explosion was an attempted pre-
emptive strike by the U.S. and the ROK, gives the order to unleash his nuclear arsenal
before it is struck. The result: nuclear bombs reach Seoul causing tremendous
devastation. General war is declared and casualties run into the millions.
Whether it is North Korea today, Ukraine tomorrow, or possibly Iran next week,
nuclear weapons proliferation continues. In this case it is important to look beyond mere
3
weapon possession. Leaders of new nuclear states may not want to deploy their arsenals,
they may want them strictly for reasons of prestige and politics. The nuclear command
and control systems themselves, however, may fail at a critical moment and escalate 4
crisis into a nuclear exchange. Such a failure would thereby destroy regional or
international stability.
A. COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURES: UNKNOWN QUANTITIES
This thesis addresses the likelihood that nuclear C2 structures in new nuclear states
might contain inherent vulnerabilities which, when the system is placed under stress, will
cause them to fail. The thesis will demonstrate the relationhship between C2
vulnerabilities and regional and international stability. Information on C2 systems in new
nuclear states is extremely limited, thus a general deductive framework for analysis is put
forward. Ukraine is the specific case study upon which the general framework will be
overlaid, to try to determine what form its C2 system would take along with the
corresponding implications for stability. It will be demonstrated that a similar evaluation
could be performed on any new or potential nuclear state.
B. THESIS ORGANIZATION
The next chapter discusses the importance of C2 to nuclear operations in new nuclear
states. It demonstrates how command and control relates to the arguments between
proliferation pessimists and deterrence optimists. 10 It also develops a framework for
analysis of C2 in new nuclear states by suggesting a typology of these states and their C2
systems. Chapter [II presents three models of C2 for analysis: the U.S., Soviet and South
10 These terms were first used by weapons proliferation specialist Peter R. Lavoy. See Lavoy, "Nuclear
Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation," Secrit L.Studles, Vol.. 2, No. 3/4, Spring/Summer 1993,
pp. 192-212. See also Scot Sagan, The Limits of Safety, (Princeton, Mass.: Princeton University Press,
1993), 264.
4
Asian. These models provide the context for discussion of how other, new nuclear states.
might seek to develop their C2 systems. The three models are used deductively and
comparatively in chapter IV, where Ukraine used as a case study of the implication for
stability that new nuclear states' C2 contain. Chapter V draws some conclusions about
the importance of C2 in new nuclear states in general and several implications for U.S.
foreign policy.
5
H: THE IMPORTANCE OF C2 WITHIN THE ARGUMENTS OF
PROLIFERATION
It is necessary to understand the current philosophies surrounding the broader issue
of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in order to demonstrate the specific connection
between command and control (hereafter C2) systems and stability. This chapter reviews
first the arguments of those pessimistic about the spread of nuclear weapons, then those
who view nuclear deterrence more optimistically. It then explores how command and
control is central to these arguments: C2 vulnerabilities fuel the pessimists concerns
while robust C2 structures lead optimists to believe that proliferation can be stabilizing.
The concepts of command and control and stability are defined, the goals of command
and control examined, and finally, implications for stability are explained.
A. THE PROLIFERATION DEBATE
Concern over the potential spread of nuclear weapons has existed from the dawn of
the atomic age. 1 1 The proliferation debate spearheaded by analysts and policy makers in
the United States has traditionally been split into two opposing camps: those who see
some merit in the increase of states possessing nuclear weapons and those who do not.
1 1Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weaon, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1946).
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1. Concerns of Proliferation Pessimists
Exemplifying what is the official position of the U.S. government, the current
Director of Naval Intelligence, RADM Edward D. Schaefer, Jr., has predicted that a
nuclear weapon will be exploded in anger within the next ten years. 12 Similarly. Leonard
Spector claims that "the spread of nuclear weapons poses one of the greatest threats of
our time and is among the most likely triggers of a future nuclear holocaust."' 13 The logic
behind Spector's thinking is that nuclear devi"es and delivery systems cannot be made to
be completely safe and foolproof. Stephen Miller, Ashton Carter and other arms control
specialists concur: as the number of nuclear weapon-capable states increase, so do the
chances for some sort of nuclear incident, whether intentional or otherwise. 14 This camp
has a number of concerns over nuclear weapons proliferation in new nuclear states:
1) Nuclear weapons will be developed by countries led by irrational dictators or
religious zealots, cases in point being Iraq, North Korea or Iran. 15
2) Nuclear weapons could be sold to or stolen by para-military or terrorist
organizations and used to further their specific agendas via nuclear blackmail. 16
3) Leaders of nuclear weapons states might lose control over some or all of their
nuclear forces in times of extreme crisis (coup attempts, civil strife, etc.)
12Lecture given at the Naval Postgraduate School, March, 1994.
13Leonard Spector, Nuclear Proliferation Today, (New York: Vintage Press, 1984), 3.
14For greater development of this issue, see Kurt M. Campbell. et. al., Soviet Nuclear Fission.
15Spector. pp. 4, 12.
161bid, 4.
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4) Nuclear forces in states with less economic resources may not be able to
afford adequate weapon safeguards or testing which could prevent inadvertent use or
detonation. 17
5) Emerging nuclear states will be vulnerable to military stike by regional rivals
to prevent the development of nuclear arsenals. 18
2. The Perspective of Nuclear Deterrence Optimists
The first serious attempt to cast a more positive light on the proliferation of
nuclear weapons was the 1981 work of Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear
Weapons: More May Be Better, He proposed that nuclear weapons capability could
generate strategic stability amoung states.. One of Waltz's fundamental assumptions is
that "uncertainty and miscalculation cause wars." 19 He claims that in a nuclear world, "a
nation will be deterred from attacking even if it believes that there is only a possibility
that its adversary will retaliate.",2 0 According to Waltz, the devastating power of the
nuclear weapons possessed by the United States and Soviet Union prevented either side
from initiating direct military confrontation against each other. This is the heart of
deterrence theory. 2 1 In Waltz's words, "victory in (nuclear) war is too dangerous to fight
for, If states can score only small gains, because large ones risk retaliation, they have
little incentive to fight."22
17Sagan. 266.
1 8Ibid, 267.
19Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weanons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper
No.171,(London: IISS, 1981), 2.
20Waltz, 16.
2lPeter D. Feaver, "Proliferation Optimism and Theories of Nuclear Operations," Security Studies, Vol. 2,
No. 3/4, (Spring/Summer 1993), 160.
22Waltz. 5.
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Waltz believes that nuclear deterrence is likely to hold for all states, even
emerging nuclear weapons states. Waltz claims that a pre-emptive strike against states
with small nuclear arsenals is not so easy:
It is so only if the would-be attacker knows that the and locations, and
knows that they will not be moved or fired before they are struck. To know all of
these things, and to know that you know them for sure, is exceedingly difficult 23
If a pre-emptive military operation is not completely effective, the possibility
exists that one or more of your opponent's nuclear weapons remains and may yet be
delivered, thereby producing unacceptable damage. This uncertainty would give pause to
even the most aggressive of states, for as Waltz says, "uncertainty deters and there would
be plenty of uncertainty.'" 24 In this way, adventuristic states would be less likely to
initiate actions which could raise the chances of interstate conflict, possibly involving
nuclear weapons. Such nuclear "leavening" thus works to diminish tensions and increase
regional or international stability.
John Mearsheimer is another leading nuclear deterrence optimist. Writing in
the journal International Security in 1990, Mearsheimer forecast four future scenarios for
Europe, with the "least dangerous" scenario being one of nuclear proliferation "well-
managed by the current nuclear powers."''
Inside of Mearsheimer's paradigm for peace and stability, however, are nuclear
weapons. Nuclear weapons "vastly expanded the violence of war, making deterrence far
more robust."'26 Nuclear weapons not only act as deterrents, guaranteeing extremely high
231bid. 16.
241bid, 15.
25John Mearsheimer. "Back To the Future." International Security, Summer 1990, (Vol. 15. No. 1), 8.
2 6Ibid. 11.
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cost during conflict, but are more useful to states seeking to protect the status quo than to
states seeking conquest. This also reinforces stability. 27
Mearsheimer also addresses the concern of proliferation pessimists about irrational
leaders possessing nuclear weapons. This is a growing concern considering the recent
surges of Neo-Nazism in Germany and the rise of the Russian Right, exemplified by the
ultra nationalist parliamentarian, Vladimir Zhirinovsky. 28 Mearsheimer claims that
malevolent nationalism encouraged by such leaders is more likely to develop "under
military systems that require reliance on mass armies" since state leaders may have to
exploit nationalistic sentiments in order to fill and sustain large armies. In contrast,
military regimes based upon highly technical security arrangements, such as nuclear
weapons, are much less susceptible to nationalistic exploitation thus work to dampen
nationalism generally. 29 As a result of these propositions, Mearsheimer believes that
expanded (but managed) nuclear proliferation would tend to equalize military power
amoung states and thus bolster stratigic stability generally.
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE PROLIFERATION DEBATE
As presented above, the main schools of thought dissagree over the degree of nuclear
proliferation. Pessimists believe that nuclear weapons may enhance stability only if
possessed by great powers while optimists argue that nuclear weapons may be stabilizing
influences in third world states as well. The point of this chapter is to demonstrate the
271bid, 20. Mearsheimer's point is that in situations where two sides have nuclear weapons, conflicts will
be ones of will vice military capabilities: the conflict will be "won" by the side willing to "run greater risks
and pay greater costs." He believes that defenders generally value their independence greater than any rival
values conquest. thus giving the edge to the defender who would risk nuclear use to save his state.
28See Stephen Kinzer, "A Climate For Demagogues," The Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 21-34 and




crucial connection between command and control systems and the arguments over the
strategic effects of nuclear proliferation. It is demonstrated that C2 systems are crucial
elements in nuclear weapons systems yet may in fact be sources of danger and instability.
C2 systems have inherent vulnerabilities which. if not addressed, can lead to geopolitical
I lities. In order to show implications for stability in emerging nuclear states, it is
III , to first define the terms command and control and stability. The role the of C2
systems in general is explored and the goals and objectives of nuclear C2 systems is put
forth.
1. Terms Defined
A good starting point is whith the concept of command and control. The official
U.S. Department of Defense definition reads as follows:
Command and control: The exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of
the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an
arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities and procedures
which are employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating and c
ontroling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 30
Carter, Steinbruner and Zraket define the command system as including "the
sensors, communications links, and command centers that form the physical network as
well as the plans, procedures, organizations, and widely shared assumptions that allow
30George E. Orr, Combat Ovs C3I: Fundamentals and Interactions, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University
Press, 1983), 23.
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the parts to work together coherently."31 In essence, C2 affects the human interface with
mechanical structures that allows weapons. in this case nuclear, to be deployed.
Like command and control, the concept of stability is not simple to define.
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionay defines it this way:
a. The strength to stand and endure: Firmness;
b. The property of a body that causes it when disturbed from a condition
of equilibrium or steady motion to develop forces or moments that restore the original
condition;
c. Resistance to.. .change or physical disintegration. 32
John Mearsheimer is less complex: "Stability is simply defined as the absence
of wars and major crises." 33
While it is clear that stability in relation to military/nuclear forces equates to
minimized or zero armed conflict between states, the concept may have additional
dimensions. Waltz discusses the connections between nuclear weapons and both
domestic and regional stability. Elements of domestic stability appear to be the
capability of "maintaining external security and internal order."'34 Waltz seems to define
regional stability as both the lack of "radical" behavior between neighboring states and
the existence of a "bipolar pattern" in a specific geographic area.35
31Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner and Charles A. Zraket, ed., Managing Nuclear Orerations,
(Washington, DC: Brookings,1987), 1.





All of these descriptions are applicable to this study of nuclear C2 systems in
new nuclear states. If a state has difficluty maintaining domestic stability for instance, it
may lose control of its nuclear arsenal. Whether the result is theft or detonation, other
states, both in the region and beyond are effected. For the purpose of this thesis.
however, the focus is on the C2 structure itself and how it might respond to threats
internal and external. It is proposed that C2 systems may be ill-equipped to deal with
pressures placed upon it and thus fail. These failures could result in theft resulting in
nuclear blackmail or accidental detonation or inadvertant employ of weapons. These
eventualities would clearly exacerbate regional and international relations possibly
leading to armed conflict. For purposes of this thesis then, stability is defined as the
status of reduced tensions, or peace, between nation-states.
2. The Importance of Command and Control
Neither deterrence optimists nor proliferation pessimists fail to mention the
crucial impact of command and control on nuclear regimes. In his belief in the positive,
stabilizing effects of the spread of nuclear weapons, Waltz states that a credible nuclear
deterrent must meet at least three requirements:
First, a part of the force must appear to be able to survive an attack and
launch one of its own. Second, survival of the force must not require early firing
in response to what may be false alarms. Third, weapons must not be susceptible
to accidental and unauthorized use.36
Each of Waltz's three requirements are direct functions of C2. Force
survivability, for instance, is an issue of hardening of silos and storage sites, hiding
weapons, and communications between command centers and nuclear forces during or
361bid, 15.
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after a nuciear barrage. The concern over deployment of nuclear weapons due to fals,,
alarms is a matter of the interaction of command authorization with the technical aspects
of intellige'nce and early warning systems. Accidental o, unauthorized use of nuclear
forces are also issues of command and control.
From the opposing side of the proliferation argument, Leonard Spector
expressed the concern that "the more nations that possess nuclear weapons, the greater
the risk that such arms will be used accidentally or inadvertently." 37 Spector believes that
"4'no nuclear command and control system can be foolproof."'38 These concerns fall into
the realm of safeguards, major imperatives of command and control. Safeguards include
physical security of weapons, authorized access, technical mechanisms on the warhead
itself to keep the weapon inert until actually employed. etc. C2 plays an extremely
important, perhaps vital, role in nuclear deterrence as well as in concerns over
proliferation: if nuclear arsenals lack components that make them safe and ensure
credibility, stability may be in jeopardy.
3. Goals of Command and Control Systems
There are three general goals towards which all of the organizational, doctrinal
and technical aspects of nuclear C2 are arranged: the security, safety and reliability of
nuclear forces. Peter Feaver defines secure weapons as those "resistant to efforts by
unauthorized people to detonate them."'39 The concept of security calls into play the
varied C2 issues of physical security of weapons during production, storage and trans-
shipment. Doctrine and procedures for handling weapons within nuclear facilities and
37Spector, 4.
381bid, A.
39Peter D. Feaver, "Command and Control In Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security, Vol. 17,
No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), 163.
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deployment sights as well as the fashioning of safeguards on the weapons or delivery
vehicles themselves are also areas of security concerns.
A safe weapon is one that is not prone to accidental detonation.-4) The safety of
nuclear weapons may be achieved through various efforts: co-locating bomb components
geographically yet not assembling them until called for:4 1 installation of safe-arm devices
such as mechanical safe-arm devices (MSADs), permissive action links (PALs) or
environmental sensing devices (ESDs). 42
Feaver defines reliability, the last of the three main goals of a nuclear force
command and control system, as a condition prevailing so that weapons are "unlikely to
fail at the mument when leaders want to use them."4 3 To insure such reliability, the
weapons must be tested to demonstrate that they will perform as advertised, and equally
critical from the C2 perspective, communications between state leaders and the weapons
themselves must be robust and redundant. If a state is unable or unlike!y to meet the
goals of security, safety and reliability of its nuclear forces, then its C2 system is in
question and implications for instability abound.
C. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Now that it has been determined that C2 concerns are integral to the arguments
surrounding nuclear proliferation, it is necessary to explore the vulnerabilities of different
40Feaver,163.
41Known as non-weaponized deterrence. It is the concept of having the requisite components of a nuclear
weapon constructed, but not assembled. It is thought that the nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan are
maintained in this fashion. See George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way In South Asia," Foreign Policy,
No. 91, Summer 1993.
42 For PALs and ESDs see Bruce Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 1993), pp. 107. 278; for MSADs see Scott D. Sagan. The Limits of Safety: Oranizations.
AXcidents and Nuclear Weapons, (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 184-185.
43Feaver, "C2 In Emerging Nuclear Nations," 163.
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types of C2 systems. Such exploration is essential to determine whether or not the
systems themselves could unintentionally exacerbate national, regional or international
tensions which could cause a precipitous escalation of a crisis resulting in military, or
worse, nuclear, conflict.
1. The Two Aspects of C2: Positive and Negative Control
Positive control over nuclear forces refers to a state's ability to effectively
deploy such forces at its discretion. Negative control is a state's ability to deny
unauthorized use of its nuclear forces. 4 Peter Feaver terms this the "always/never
dilemma," the condition where state leaders can always count on the reliability of their
nuclear forces while knowing that unauthorized use will never occur.45
2. Threats to Positive and Negative Control
The distinct aspects of C2 exhibit differing vulnerabilities and experience
differing threats to control. The primary assault on positive control of a state's nucleal
force is pre-emption. A pre-emptive strike is conducted by one state against another in
the hope of knocking out the other state's capability to retaliate. 46 Pre-emption assumes
great significance in the realm of nuclear deterrence: if a state can achieve a successfi'l
pre-emptive strike against its opponent's nuclear force, the opponent will have lost the
ability to retaliate with unacceptable damage and thus nuclear deterrence will have failed.
The state which has lost its nuclear response is now impotent and at the mercy of its
enemy's dictates.47 Several strategies of pre-emption exist. One is to strike at an
44Ibid, 163 and John D. Sttinbruner in Managing Nuclear O2erations, 539.
45Feaver, "Command and Control In Emerging Nuclear Nations. "162.
"6For a good treatise on the differing concepts of pre-emptive versus preventive military strikes, see Waltz,
The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 14-17.
4 7John D. Steinbruner develops this issue more fully in "Nuclear Decapitation," Foreign Policy, No.45,
(Winter 1981-82), 16-28.
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opponent's nuclear weapons themselves. Another is to hit the delivery vehicles.4 Yet
another is to cut off a state's ability to command the weapons and vehicles at its disposal.
Cold War studies have revealed that such a strategy, termed decapitation, was vigorously
pursued by both superpowers. 49 As C2 came to be viewed as the weakest link in the
nuclear chain, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union invested massively into efforts to
protect C2 elements: command bunkers, mobile command posts, communications links
hardened against the effects of electro-magnetic pulse, etc.50
While decapitation threatens a state's ability to command its nuclear arsenal, the
issue of unwanted use is the main challenge to negative control. This challenge may be
further broken down into accidental and unauthorized use. Peter Feaver states that
"unwanted use is destabilizing." 51 Nuclear accidents would cause a tremendous amount
of physical and ecological damage, as well as many casualties. Use of nuclear weapons
without authorization would likely trigger a nuclear or conventional military response or
both.
3. Delegative Versus Assertive C2
Concerns over threats to a state's positive and negative control of its nuclear
forces compel states to respond to these challenges by adoption of measures which result
in greater or lesser control over its weapons. Should a state fear decapitation, it might opt
for measures to ensure positive control, or command, over its forces. In this case a state
would be concentrating on achievement of the goal of reliability. Towards this end, state
leaders might feel compelled to provide lower-echelon commanders with the legal
48Both Feaver and Perkoviicil agree that small arsenals are choice targets for pre-emptive strikes.
49See BI!,- op.124-126.
50Soviet leadership went to extreme lengths in these areas. See Blair. pp. 59-115.
5 IFeaver, "C2 In Emerging Nuclear Nations," 164.
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authorization to release their nuclear weapons should central or national command
authority (NCA) be neutralized by a decapitative strike. Such devolution of nuclear
weapon release authority is termed delegation or pre-delegation. 52 An important aspect of
a delegative system is that even if lower-echelon commanders have not been given clear
legal authorization to release the weapons at their discretion, there are few physical
mechanisms in place to prevent them from doing so.53 The U.S. command system is
replete with examples of how nuclear authority evolved from an assertive to pre-
delegative stance.54
A state more preoccupied with the goals of security would lean more towards
insuring negative control over its nuclear forces. The NCA of this state would institute
measures to permit it assertive control over the use of its weapons. In this case lower-
echelon commanders may or may not have legal authorization to use nuclear weapons
under their command, but intrusive mechanisms would be in place to prevent use without
specific authorization from above. A C2 system with a more assertive bent would depend
less on subordinate loyalty as on use control devices such as PALs, or procedures
requiring multiple personnel to be present every time nuclear warheads were accessible.
4. C2 Failure Modes
A new nuclear state's existing C2 structure represents a de facto resolution of
that state's consideration of positive and negative control, or Feaver's always/never
dilemma. This obtains whether or not a state has given these issues much thought or not.
52See Feaver. 168 and Blair, pp. 45-52.
53Feaver.169.
54Paul Bracken reviews this in depth in Command and Control of Nuclear Forces.The Command and
Control of Nuclear Forces, (New Haven: Yale University Press,1983). See specifically pp. 197-200. For
analysis of the U.S. Navy's nuclear delegation authority see George E. Miller, "Who Needs PALs?,"
Proceedinas of the U.S. Naval Institute, July 1988, pp. 50-56.
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For example, South Africa had not taken these points into consideration at all. Moreover.
when confronted with the implications for stability, the South Africans were apathetic. 55
Ignorance of the issues of C2 vulnerabilities by leaders of nuclear states is what is at
issue, because systemic C2 vulnerabilities may lead to C2 failures. Such failures could
prove all the more catastrophic if they appear in realms least-expected by state leaders.
Peter Feaver has estimated that C2 systems that are more delegative in their
orientation are likely to fail "deadly." 56 Delegative systems, precisely because they fear a
pre-emptive loss of force or decapitation, will assume a "hair trigger" posture and be
prepared to launch on warning. As a result, lower-echelon commanders, in the midst of
crisis, might deploy the nuclear weapons under their cognizance due to misperception,
inaccurate intelligence or accidental/temporary loss of communications with national
command authority. In such a scenario the commander might believe he was truly acting
in the best interest of his country, even believe that he was acting under pre-delegated
orders, in deploying his nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, the NCA, with superior "big
picture" intelligence or unaware of some sort of communications failure, could only look
on with surprise and horror as one of its own nuclear-tipped missiles or aircraft with
nuclear bomb on board disappeared over the horizon. Thus the C2 system failed deadly:
the failure resulted in the use of nuclear weapons.
With assertive systems, the physical, intrusive safeguards take time to overcome
before the weapons can be used. Under attack, the time required to "unlock" all of the
protective mechanisms might be too great to be able to disperse or deploy the weapons
before they are destroyed on the ground. Thus it is postulated that assertive systems
55Counter proliferation specialist Mitchel Reiss raised these concerns with South African officials during a
recent visit to Pretoria. According to Reiss. the officials "didn't care at all." Interview. 20 May 1994.
56Feaver, 162.
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might fail "safely" or "impotently." 57 While such a circumstance would prove
unfavorable to the state under actual nuclear attack, a relatively slower, less reactionary
C2 system might prove a god-send-in the case where a perceived strike turned out to be a
false alarm. If John Mearsheimer is correct in his proposition that nuclear weapons are
better suited to function as defensive vice offensive weapons, this suggests that an
assertive C2 structure may prove to be a more stabilizing system than a delegative one in
a confrontation between two nuclear-armed rivals.58
5. Determinants Of C2 Structure
There are several factors which impact upon a new nuclear state's decision to
construct either a more delegative or more assertive command and control structure.
Peter Feaver believes that civil-military relations and the issue of time-urgency are two
such factors. Applying organizational theory, Feaver states that "insiders" of large
bureaucracies "naturally resist outsiders' interference in cherished operations, and
jealously guard their autonomy of activity." Military commanders, then, would prefer a
delegative C2 structure.59 Contrarily, bureaucratic leaders "seek mechanisms to enhance
their control over the behavior of critical elements of an organization."'60 This leads to
the conclusion that civilians prefer more assertive control. If this is true in general, then
57 Ibid. 162.
58Mearsheimer, 20. Waltz is also skeptical of the likelihood that a state would actually attempt a pre-




the logic should particularly apply afortiori to nuclear operations where the costs of loss
of control can be so high.61
The concept of civil-military relations is further broken down by Feaver into the
categories of stable versus volatile. States having experienced a stable pattern of relations
between the civilian government and the military, in which governance has been separate
from the military, typically results in a greater delegation of authority. If the military has
played a greater role in running the country (periodic coupe de etats, power-sharing, etc.)
and the civilian government is weak, the pattern of civil-military relations is volatile and
increases the need for more assertion by government leaders. Feaver suggests this may
be more problematic if nuclear weapons are viewed as "symbols of political power:" the
weapons themselves may "become stakes in a domestic power struggle."162 Under such
circumstances, assertive C2 would be even more highly valued.
Feaver's second factor which determines C2 proclivity towards delegation or
assertion is what he terms time-urgency: "the degree to which the leaders of the new
nuclear state require that the arsenal be ready for immediate and rapid use." 63 Under the
rubric of time-urgency, other issues emerge as contributing factors. New nuclear states
are likely to have small arsenals and limited numbers of delivery systems. Most new
nuclear states have regional rivals64 and some lack the geographic size to widely disperse
their weapons. As a result, the national command authorities in these states will be faced
6 1Feaver seems to have constructed the civil-military factor upon the basis of overall civilian control. It
would be curious to see if the logic holds within purely militaristic regimes: do lower-echelon commanders
desire more autonomy over nuclear weapons than national (military) leaders would want to extend?
62Feaver. 176.
631bid, 178.
64Ibid, 178. Also, a long-time U.S. government analyst commented that leaders of new nuclear states and
potential nuclear states are reading the literature of deterrence optimists and believing the validity of that
side of the proliferation debate. Interview, 25 May 1994.
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with the challenges of a pre-emptive, surgical strike against their arsenals combined with
extremely brief reaction times. 65 These conditions, individually or collectively, function
to impart to the new nuclear state "a strong incentive to use the arsenal early in a conflict
before the enemy destroys it," according to Feaver. 66 This leads once again to a "hair
trigger" posture which could lead to de-stabilizing and undesired crisis escalation.
While Feaver's factors of civil-military relations and time-urgency are
instructive, they are not all-inclusive. Other concepts exist which may impact the
development of a C2 system in a new nuclear state (see Figure 1). These include such
considerations as internal, as well as external threats, resource limitations and the issue of
secrecy.
It is clear that the regional context will effect a state's C2 structure: close
proximity between nuclear armed rivals can exert pressure on the C2 structure to be
delegative and maintain an aggressive "use-it-or-lose-it" posture. 67 Yet internal threats
may exist as well. A state may not be volatile in regard to its military forces, as described
by Feaver's development of the civil-military paradigm, but by other divisive elements,
such as separatist movements, mass protest groups, terrorist organizations or cultural
hatreds. Examples might be the Basque Separatists in Spain, the "Greens" environmental
movement in Germany, the Irish Republican Army in Britain or the various cultural
factions warring against one another in the former Yugoslavia. Any or all of these
internal threats could be present inside an emerging nuclear weapons-capable state.
65Paul Bracken discusses this concern from the Soviet viewpoint of Pershing missiles stationed in
Germany: the Pershings had a four-minute time of flight from Germany to Moscow. See Bracken, 222.
66Feaver, 178.
67George Perkovich highlights the India-Pakistan circumstance which defies this convention. Perkovich
believes that the nuclear rivals on the subcontinent have opted for "non-weaponized deterrence," where
nuclear weapons exist in a non-completed, component form. See Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third Way in
South Asia," FeignfPlicy, No. 91, Summer 1993, pp. 85-105.
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While Kenneth Waltz believes that nuclear weapons are unsuitable for use in a
civil war environment, others disagree. 68 Regardless of this possibility, in times of
massive unrest and widespread civil disobedience, concern for the safety and security of
nuclear weapons is at its highest. It is not impossible to construct the scenario in which
minimally-guarded nuclear weapons depots are overwhelmed by mass protesters. 69
Three unpleasant possibilities could be envisioned. First, in the chaos, some nuclear
warheads are seized by organized crime and spirited away to be held for ransom or sold
on the black market to the highest bidder.70 Second. during the melee a weapon, lacking
safeguards, is accidentally launched or detonated in place. A regional nuclear rival,
receiving the nuclear blow, would most likely retaliate in-kind. Or, learning of the
detonation through intelligence, the rival may perceive that its opponent had attempted to
launch one weapon, which failed, but which indicated that more would be on the way.
Thus a hasty nuclear strike would be in order before those weapons arrived. Such a
sequence of events is more plausible during a time of heightened interstate tensions. 71 A
third possibility might be that a nuclear rival would seek to exploit the perceived C2
weakness of its opponent and conduct a pre-emptive strike while the state embroiled in
unrest struggled to regain domestic order. Regardless of the scenario, they demonstrate
the potentially destabilizing effects that internal crises can have on nuclear C2.
68 A U.S. government analyst stated that in his view. elements in some new nuclear states would consider
using nuclear weapons in a civil war. Interview, 24 May 1994.
69A nuclear weapons depot was in fact temporarily overrun by civilians in Baku in 1990.
70Seymour Hersh believes this is a distinct possibility within Russia today. See Hersh, "The Wild East,"
The Atlantic Monthly, June 1994, pp. 61-86.
71Gregory F. Giles puts forth a similar scenario in "Safeguarding the Undeclared Nuclear Arsenals."
Washington Quartelv, Spring 1993, 183.
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Internal threats such as described above could be particularly destabilizing in
emerging nuclear weapons states where financial resources are scarce. In such states
security budgets may not allow for many elements of C2 considered vital in the West.
For instance resources may not be available to develop warhead mechanical safe-arm
devices (MSADs), use-control devices such as PALs and ESDs, or to adequately test
them. As a result, the safety and security of nuclear weapons would be less certain. 72
Physical security (fences, armed guards, mechanical locks, etc.) is less expensive.
However, budgetary shortfalls might result in the underpayment of troops charged with
the physical security of the weapons or warheads. This could adversely effect the morale
of these troops to the point of carelessness or worse, vulnerability to bribery.73 Thus,
lack of resources for nuclear operations can leave an emerging nuclear state's C2 system
vulnerable in the realm of negative control.
Lastly, a new nuclear state's C2 system will be influenced by the overarching
decision of that state whether or not to proclaim itself an overt nuclear weapons power or
to conduct nuclear operations covertly and join the ranks of "opaque" nuclear states. 74
Opaque nuclear states must operate under some constraints not felt by the five avowed
nuclear states. Nuclear weapons states managing operations covertly are not able to fully
develop an integrated early warning and intelligence system such as those enjoyed by the
Big Five. Construction of major radar facilities and orbiting of reconnaissance satellites
could indicate the existence of a nuclear weapons program. If such components were
72Paul Bracken states that during the early years of U.S. nuclear weapon development, reliability was the
primary concern, not safety. See Bracken, 186.
73Seymour Hersh cites the example of a 1991 scheme to purchase a tactical nuclear warhead from a
Russian Army lieutenant who had charge over a nuclear weapons storage bunker in East Germany. See
Hersh, 72.
74Conventional wisdom holds that Israel, India, Pakistan and perhaps North Korea comprise this group.
South Africa broke ranks in 1992 when it decided to divest itself of its nuclear weapons.
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deviloped under the pretext of supporting conventional military operations, they may not
be well integrated into nuclear operations. During a true nuclear crisis, unexpected
developments could occur. Scot Sagan claims that "in large and very complex
organizations ...one should expect that the unexpected will occue, that unimaginable
interactions will develop, that accidents will happen." 7 5
Along similar lines, opaque nuclear weapons states also are not at liberty to test
(detonate, launch delivery vehicles, etc.) their weapons for safety and reliability. Also,
they may be constrained from conducting nuclear C2 exercises to teach proper procedures
to the personnel operating the forces and to exercise the connectivity of the entire
network. With this limitation, it is difficult if not impossible to know where systemic
vulnerabilities exist until discovery during a real crisis. Breakdowns in communications
or procedures, whether in attempting to authorize a launch or while trying to relax an alert
could lead to "deadly" or "impotent" C2 failures.





















Fig. 1 The Framework For C2 Development
6. Implications For Stability
All of the determinants of the structure of a state's C2 system reviewed above
have implications for stability. It is useful therefore to try to pull together some of these
implications in a fashion that will be useful to policy makers, both in new nuclear states
and the West, when analyzing the current status or projected development of a state's C2
structure. What is lacking in the current literature is an analytical tool that will reveal
some, if not all, of the major vulnerabilities of a C2 system and the corresponding
implications for stability. Such a tool, perhaps termed a "checklist for stable C2," would
be particularly helpful when applied to emerging nuclear weapon states where
information is scarce (see Figure 2). The "checklist" will identify major potentialities for
C2 vulnerability and related instabilities that can be explored in greater detail when
applied to specific case studies.
The "checklist for stable C2" may be divided into two areas of evaluation:
hardware and software issues. Hardware means the physical structures of the C2
infrastructure while software equates to more procedural concerns. Hardware issues
26
include redundant and robust communications;7 6 strategic or tactical early warning and
intelligence alerting systems: protected command centers and intelligence dissemination
nodes:77 sufficient measures against the effects of electro-magnetic pulse (EMP)-78
technical safeguards on the weapons themselves, protecting against both accidental
detonation (safety) as well as unauthorized use (security). 79
The checklist's software issues might include such concerns as personnel
reliability screening and multi-person control. 80 Additional aspects of procedure would
include exercises of the entire C2 system. In this vein, the existence of codified
procedures and training regimes would lead to greater operator efficiency and reduce the
likelihood of operator error in time of crisis. Lastly, an item that could be considered
under either hardware or software headings is that of "'learning mechanisms." A learning
mechanism might be a government agency (such as the AEC in the U.S.) or a civilian
think tank dedicated towards nuclear operations research. These institutions would work
together with nuclear drills or exercises to monitor daily nuclear operations to ferret out





7 6Soviet leadership went to extreme lengths to insure communications with its nuclear forces. Bruce Blair
expounds upon this in Blair, pp. 59-115.
77For greater detail see Blair, pp. 120-121.
78For examples see Bracken, 112.
79 Using mechanical safe-arm devices (MSADs), permissive actions links (PALs) and environmental
sensing devices (ESDs).










Fig. 2 The Checklist For Stable C2
D: A TYPOLOGY OF NEW NUCLEAR STATES AND C2 SYSTEMS
It is important to understand that not all new nuclear states, or even potential nuclear
states, fall into the sameproliferation category. Distinctions are significant in that new or
emerging nuclear states will face different constraints which will impact the development
of their nuclear C2 systems. Understanding a particular state's constraints will cue the
C2 analyst to investigate the vulnerabilities to which that group's C2 is prone.
1. A TYPOLOGY OF NEW NUCLEAR STATES
New nuclear states exist or will emerge from one of three categories of
countries: poor, wealthy or inheritor. The majority of current and suspected future
nuclear weapon states could be generally classified as poor countries. Current opaque
proliferators certainly fall into this category: India, Pakistan and North Korea.8 1
Conventional wisdom holds that future nuclear weapons capable states will emerge from
8 1Israel and South Africa (before it decided to denuclearize) do not readily fit into this paradigm; neither
would be considered "poor" states. Nevertheless Israel's economy would contract sharply if U.S. economic
aid (approximately 10 billion dollars per annum) was curtailed. Similarly South Africa found the return on
its nuclear weaporns investment too low to warrant international isolation and economic sanctions.
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within this category as well: [ran. Iraq, Libya. Argentina and Brazil. 82 Other potential
candidates to become nuclear v&eapons capable states may be found in the wealthy
category of proliferant states. Germany and Japan are examples. While not considered to
be seeking nuclear weapons, arguments have been made by John Mckarsheimer. among
others, that the controlled nuclearization of major power states in general, and Germany
in particular, would lead to greater international stability. 83 Both of these states have
strong economies, advanced nuclear technology, fissile material and significant external
threats. As a result, conventional wisdom has it that these states could develop nuclear
weapons in short order if required to do so.
The third category of new nuclear states is that of inheritor. This category is
unique in that only Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have become nuclear weapon states
over night. Although Belarus and Kazakhstan have renounced any claim to pursue an
independent nuclear capability, their ability to conduct such operations was limited
without assistance from Moscow. Ukraine is more interesting as an inheritor state in that
it possess arsenals , C2 structures and a trianed staff from the Soviet Union. However it
must now revive the former Soviet system with its own resources.
It will assist the C2 analyst in his quest to determine a new nuclear state's
C2 system to know first the broad category into which his target country falls. Knowing
the general constraints a country faces will enable the analyst to focus his research along
these lines in order to produce a more accurate deductive picture of the target country's
C2 system.
8 2 Leonard S. Spector, Nuclear Ambitions (Boulder:. Westview Press, 1990), 6.
83Mearsheimer. "Back To The Future," 38 and 'The Case For a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent," Foreizn
Aairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, 51.
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a. Poor Nuclear Weapon States
By definition, poor countries are constrained by their relative lack of
resources. Using the general framework developed in chapter two, an economically
challenged state is likely to create a small arsenal, particularly in the beginning years of
its weapons program. As a result, the tendency will be for a delegative C2 structure, with
weapons dispersed and/or hidden, and lower-echelon commanders having predelegated
weapons release authorization to offset these vulnerabilities. Poor nuclear countries will
have less resources to devote to weapons safeguards, nuclear C2 exercises and, possibly,
adequate pay to personnel guarding the arsenal. These conditions lead to the conclusion
that typically C2 systems in poor nuclear weapons states will be highly delegative, with
"avorable applications for positive control, but weak in mechanisms to insure negative
control. In a crisis, the likely failure mode would be "deadly."
b. Wealthy Nuclear Weapons States
Countries with more resources at their disposal may produce more nuclear
weapons and diversify their means of delivery.84 These states might feel that they stand
to lose more than poorer countries (international prestige, global economic market share,
regional influence, etc.) and so may feel compelled to insure their arsenals' safety and
security as much, if not more, than their reliability. To this end wealthy nuclear states
will devote resources to weapon safeguards, both internal and external to the weapons
themselves. While these points are assumptions, the net effect of such an emphasis mat
lead to a more assertive C2 system.
84AU of the Big Five nuclear powers have multiple avenues of weapon delivery. V. K. Nair advocates
India's procurement of ballistic missile submarines to enhance the credibility of India's nuclear deterrent.
Most nuclea- weapons and security specialists agree that ballistic missile submarines offer the greatest
degree of protections to a state's nuclear arsenal. In this way they also guarantee a higher degree of stability
between nuclear rivals since a second strike capability would be secure.
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c. .Inheritors
This group is thus far limited to Belarus. Kazakhstan and Ukraine. As
Belarus and Kazakhstan have never temporized over their intent to denuclearize and sign
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear states, only Ukraine remains for
some speculation. In the case of inheritors it is rational to begin a C2 analysis based upon
the C2 heritage of that state. With Ukraine for instance, it inherited elements of the
Soviet Union's redundant and robust command system. This system was directed from
Moscow and, as the next chapter illustrates, was highly centralized. This being the case,
Ukraine's C2 structure may be inclined to accentuate negative, assertive control. Thus
C2 vulnerabilities are likely to cause it to fail "safely." On the other hand, critical
elements of early warning and intelligenc from the Soviet C2 system were not passed on
to Ukraine. Furhter, Ukraine's economic constraints may force it to forego weapon
safeguards, should it develop indigenous nuclear warheads, or adequate warhead
maintenance, as has been the case with the arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union.85
2. A TYPOLOGY OF COMMAND AND CONTROL
There exists very little analysis on the connection between types of C2 and
stability levels. In other words, for every amount of investment made into a state's
nuclear C2 apparatus, how great is the return in terms of stability'? This is a highly
relevant issue to leaders of new or potential nuclear weapon states. Investment into C2
can be a very expensive one.86 States with scarce resources do not want to place their
national treasure into something if the return is marginal, or worse, negative.8 7
8 5 See Perlez, A3.
86 Bruce Blair notes that the U.S. military budget would have been bankrupted had the government invested
in C2 as heavily as did the Soviets. See Blair, pp. 120-121.
87 After tremendous national investment in C2, the U.S. command system is still vulnerable. See Bracken,
pp. 212-213.
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Equating C2 investment with stability is also of interest to Western policy
makers. If it is likely that an incremental improvement in C2 capabilities will result in
correspondingly improved regional stability, then it may be in the West's best interest to
assist the new nuclear state to reach a higher plane of C2.
To determine how C2 type equates to regional stability, it is fruitful to consider
C2 in general as being divided into four groups: centralized, decentralized, simple and
complex.
a. Centralized C2
A centralized C2 system values security as its highest goal. As a result,
lower-echelon commanders will not be granted wide latitude in decisions regarding the
nuclear forces under their charge. Intrusive mechanisms such as authorization codes
from state leaders and multiple-man control will be instituted throughout the nuclear
weapon command structure.
The principle vulnerability to centralized C2 systems is timeliness. In times
of crisis, the systemic intrusive devices may slow the weapon deployment process down
to the point where weapons cannot be used before a rival's pre-emptive strike arrives.
Thus a centralized system would likely fail "safely."
The relationship between centralized C2 systems and stability is positive
however: a failure in the "safe" mode is unlikely to generate a counter nuclear response
from a regional rival. In this way tense inter-regional crises are not exacerbated and
escalated by a premature deployment of a nuclear weapon. Also, due to the relatively
slow nature of response within centralized C2 systems, false alarms can be evaluated as
such and the process of raising alert levels can be reversed before a weapon is released.
In this way also, the escalation to hostilities is delayed and stability is buoyed.
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b. Decentralized C2
In a decentralized C2 system. national command authority has delegated
nuclear weapon release authorization down to lower-echelon commanders. This is done
to maximize the goal of reliability: should the NCA be destroyed or isolated by a
decapitative strike, lower-echelon commanders would have the standing order to release
their weapons in retaliation. In a decentralized C2 system few intrusive devices stand
between lower-echelon commanders and their ability to deploy a weapon. The
heightened likelihood that a second strike would occur bolsters nuclear deterrence: a
nuclear rival will think twice before initiating conflict. 88 In this way stability too is
reinforced.
Yet should a systemic C2 vulnerability arise unexpectedly (accidental
detonation, loss of communications at a critical moment, etc.) the decentralized C2 is
likely to fail "deadly:" lower-echelon commanders might release their weapons under
false pretenses. Such a "deadly" failure would most likely trigger a military (probably
nuclear) response and events could spiral out of control. Viewed from this perspective,
the interests of stability are not well-served by a decentralized C2 system.
c). Simplistic C2
A simplistic C2 system might be described by its lack of technical
sophistication. For example the communication linkages between a state's National
Command Authority and its nuclear forces may not be redundant or hardened against
sabotage or the effects of electro-magnetic pulse. Simple C2 may have limited or no
early warning or other forms of intelligence cueing that can provide the NCA with the
proper situational awareness required to make informed security decisions. Weapons
release authorization procedures might also be unsophisticated: a telephone call from a
8 8 Waltz. Spread of Nuclear Weapons, 18.
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state leader to a weapons commander, authenticated by pre-arranged code words.
Electro-mechanical locks on warheads or delivery vehicles, such as permissive action
links (PALs), might not exist.
Simple C2 could also be described procedurally. For example weapon
release authority cou-I 'side with only a single state leader, such as the president or
prime minister.8 9 N, ,.ar warhead control procedures may not include multiple-man
control each time the weapon is handled. Other procedural glitches might unknowingly
exist if the system is not exercised on a regular basis to insure connectivity and the
proficiency of C2 operators throughout the system. Similarly, irnstitutions dedicated to
the evaluation and improvement of nuclear operations may not exist. Such "learning
mechanisms" could function as repositories of lessons-learned so that previous C2
mistakes are not repeated. This would help to streamline the entire system.90
The unsophisticated nature of a simple C2 system adds to stability in the
sense that there are relatively few technical elements that could fail. For instance,
"phantom" enemy weapons launches will not be detected on early warning radar displays
because such equipment does not exist in a simple C2 system. The lack of nuclear false
alarms increases stability: a state's nuclear forces do not rise to a higher level of alert.
On the other hand, the lack of weapons safeguards could leave a nuclear
arsenal vulnerable to accidental or inadvertent launch or detonation. Inadequate
procedures for handling nuclear weapons, such as the lack of multiple-man control, could
lead to handling carelessness and susceptibility to theft. If a simple C2 system does not
89Mitcheil Reiss related that the South Africans had not devised contingency plans to replace the president
in the nuclear chain of command should he become incapacitated: the president alone held the release
authcrity codes. Interview, 20 May 1994.
90Bracken describes the creation and function of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission to perform this task.
See Bracken. 180.
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possess some type of nuclear operations "learning mechanism," and is not regularly
exercised, it is susceptive to repeating former mistakes unwittingly and continuously.
The lack of early warning and intelligence can make state leaders feel isolated, in the dark
and vulnerable to actions being planned or executed beyond their borders. As a result,
they might react by raising military alert levels which could be reciprocated by rivals and
an escalation loop begins.
d) Complex C2
The vertical and horizontal integration of intelligence and computers is the
hallmark of an advanced C2 system. 91 An advanced system would incorporate early
warning radar, overhead satellite sensors and other forms of intelligence to provide near
real-time information to state leaders. Communications in such a system would be
redundant and robust. The nuclear weapons themselves would be made one-point-safe
and have other electronic and electro-mechanical safing and locking devices. 9 2
Procedurally, multi-man control would be instituted, the system would be exercised on a
regular basis to ensure connectivity, and learning mechanisms would be in place to
evaluate the C2 process.
As a result, complex C2 systems would address all of the goals of nuclear
operations: reliability, safety and security. Attempts to approach a balance in all three
areas enhances stability. The weapons are reliable, so deterrence is bolstered. They are
safe, so that warheads will not detonate accidentally or launch inadvertently. This
prevents unnecessary or unexpected crises or crisis exacerbation. Finally, the weapons
9 IBracken, 214
92Either on the warhead itself, the delivery vehicle or both. See Stephev E. Miller, "Assistance to Newly
Proliferating Nations," in Robert Blackwill and Albert Carnesale, eds., New Nuclear Nations:
Consenuences For U.S. Policy, (New York. Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 116.
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will be technologically secure from unauthorized use; this will ease state leaders'
concerns about negative control.
Complex C2 systems are not immune from de-stabilizing vulnerabilities,
however. Due to the tremendous reliance on technology, component failure in computer
or intelligence systems could lead to confusion and the raising of alert levels needlessly. 93
Additionally, because reaction time is so critical to complex C2 systems, and intelligence
and operations are so tightly fused, the entire structure may become like a coiled spring,
waiting to released into action. Therefore a slight incident, detected by the vast
intelligence network, could function to knock the system out of its tense equilibrium and
propel the system to automatically rise to higher alert levels. 94 If not addressed, the
system, particularly if highly automated, could seek release authority prematurely. Such
activities adversely effect stability.
This chapter developed a general framework for analysis that enables a
researcher to better determine what form a new nuclear state's C2 system might take. It
also developed a tool to estimate the implications on stability that a new nuclear state's
C2 system may have. The next chapter will explore three known models of C2: the U.S.,
Soviet and South Asian. These models will provide a real world context for further
discussion of C2 types and what influences their development. These models could
further serve to become the basis for deductive and comparative analyses of any new
nuclear state's C2 system.
93The movie "War Games" highlighted how a computer malfunction in a U.S. strategic command and
control center almost initiated Global Thermonuclear War.
94Bracken. 215.
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III: C2 MODELS FOR NEW NUCLEAR STATES
A. THE NEED FOR DEDUCTIVE AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSES
Analysis of C2 structures in new or potential nuclear states cannot be accomplished
empirically: the information is not available. There are three reasons why this is so.
First, a state's nuclear command and control apparatus is a major issue of national
security. ;uch it is highly classified. 95 The open source literature seldom evaluates
C2 systemh , iemselves.96 The final reason deduction and comparison is required is that
for potential nuclear weapons states, the arsenals do not yet exist, much less the systems
to command and control them. Nevertheless, as proliferation continues, nuclear C2
systems will evolve, whether their implications for stability are considered or not.
Since nuclear C2 operations in new nuclear states are ambiguous, a context is needed
in which to frame a discussion of the issue. This may best be done through investigation
of the C2 systems about which the most is known. This is helpful not only because it
provides a point of departure for discussion, but also because new nuclear states have to
start somewhere also. It is logical that these states will review their nuclear predecessors
for guidance on C2 development as well. 97
95Peter Feaver claims that information on the U.S. C2 structure of even forty years ago is difficult to
obtain, much less about the C2 in new nuclear states. "C2 in Emerging Nuclear Nations." 162.
96Bruce Blair claims that "no one in Washington" is actively pursuing the implications of C2 of potential
nuclear-armed states. Interview, 24 May 1994.
97Feaver believes that an evolutionary progression exists in the development of nuclear C2 for all new
nuclear states. He predicts however that new nuclear states can get a "jump" on this development if they
are students of the lessons of older nuclear states. Feaver, 173.
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The models of nuclear C2 explored in this chapter for deductive analysis are the
United States and the Soviet Union. More is known about these states'C2 systems than
any other. Further, they provide two very different perspectives on nuclear operations:
the U.S. model is delegative, the Soviet assertive. The model used for comparative
analysis is that of India and Pakistan. The South Asian model offers an alternative to the
traditional C2 methods of the superpowers in that these states have resource constraints
more likely to be experienced by new or emerging nuclear states.
B. MODELS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL
1. The U.S. Nuclear Command System.
More material exists in the open literature concerning the command and control
system of the United States than on any other state's C2. As a result, it is quite likely that
other potential proliferating states would review the U.S. model for application to its own
C2 efforts. By evaluating the U.S. model, a new nuclear state may be able to learn
valuable lessons in C2 without conducting the actual trials and errors themselves,
particularly if such a state was seeking opaque proliferation. a. Evolution of the U.S. C2
system
Command and control specialist Paul Bracken takes "what may be called a life-
cycle approach to the American command system."98 He divides U.S. C2 development
into four distinguishable phases: birth, developmental, transitional, and mature. In the
initial phase of the U.S. C2 program, the novelty, secrecy, and limited numbers of aton-dc
weapons led to tight centralized control. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the
Atomic Energy Commission, within which was the Division of Military Application,
98Paul Bracken. , 3.
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interfacing between the AEC and the military.99 During the early years of U.S. nuclear
power status, all atomic weapons and sub-components were under AEC civilian control.
Only upon executive order of the President would these weapons and components be
released to the military for mating with deployment vehicles. 1°° The U.S. President thus
had direct, almost personal, control of the nuclear arsenal, which, it must be remembered,
was still quite small.
The limitations of this arrangement began to emerge as the result of the
Czechoslovakian and Berlin Crises in Europe in the late 1940's and the outbreak of the
Korean War in 1950. U.S. military elites argued that the rather cumbersome procedure of
linkage to the AEC prevented the military from carrying out its "mandated assignments
unless it had prompt access to these weapons."' 0 1 By 1953 civilian control of nuclear
weapons had become superfluous; in 1956 the U.S. stockpile was turned over to the
military. 102
Bracken describes the period of 1955-1960 as a development phase. Due to the
rapid advancement of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in terms of number of weapons and
delivery vehicles (strategic bomber force and missile technology), the U.S. perceived the
need for a plan to cope with a Soviet attack on U.S. strategic forces as well as new
mechanisms that would facilitate the deployment of U.S. nuclear forces at a moment's
notice. To achieve these goals, three requirements were identified: a much larger nuclear
991bid. 180.
1001bid.
10 1Ibid. It is worthy to note that the civilian concern with turning over complete atomic systems to the




force, an advanced early warning system, and a more streamlined command structure. 10 3
These requirements triggered a host of C2 initiatives which have become the basis of the
current U.S. system: a massive investment in early warning systems. the vertical and
horizontal integration of intelligence into the C2 structure and the safeguarding and
replacement of the president in time of crisis. Nevertheless, the C2 structure of this
period remained inflexible in that the overall strategy was based on massive attack or
retaliation to a detected Soviet strike; in essence an "all or nothing" approach.
To deal with this, U.S. nuclear planners developed the concept of flexible
response: the ability to apply nuclear force in limited amounts and to involve the civilian
leadership in whatever application of force was to occur. 1°4 This transition to flexible
response, from 1961-1967, Bracken termed transitional. In order to accommodate this
policy shift, the command side of the U.S. C2 system had to be sure that the National
Command Authority (NCA) would survive a Soviet first strike. Along with this,
survivable communications between the NCA and nuclear forces had to be established.
In regards to control, U.S. nuclear forces themselves had to be able to withstand a Soviet
nuclear strike requiring hardening of missile silos, etc. 105
The major result of these efforts was increased decentralization of command
authority over nuclear forces. Essentially, military commanders of nuclear forces were
afforded predelegation from the NCA.,0 6 As a result of this step, these elite military
commanders became the triggers which could deploy the U.S. arsenal, while the NCA







would be 'on". If the NCA was decapitated by a preemptive strike, the triggers (the
military leaders) would be pulled and weapons would theoretically be launched. 107
To complete the life-cycle analogy, Bracken describes 1968 and forward as the
time of maturity of the U.S. system. The modem or mature C2 system is characterized by
five factors. First, due to the dramatic increase in the total number of Soviet and U.S.
nuclear warheads, the command structures of both sides began to represent weak links in
the security structures of both states due to the difficulty of managing large arsenals.' 08
Thus, it is widely assumed that nuclear contingency plans focus on the destruction of
command and control structures, making these structures more vulnerable than ever.
A second factor is the continued vertical integration of warning and intelligence
systems with nuclear forces. According to Bracken, "the system that resulted from these
changes must surely be the most technologically elaborate organization ever constructed
by man." 109 The resultant effect however, was to produce a command and control system
that was so tightly coupled and interdependent that "a small stimulus reverberated
worldwide." 110 Thus complex layers of checks and balances, "fail safe" procedures and
human intervention were required to counter the system's taughtness.
Third, the complexity of the U.S. C2 structure has increased considerably.
According to Bracken,
"Twenty years of integrating a complex warning and intelligence system






lines...(which) ...interconnect the commands and numbered armies, air forces, and
fleets in a way that violates a smooth flow of authority."I 11
In peacetime this complex structure has proved relatively stable and functional.
Under extreme crisis conditions, however, the multiple layers of chains of command and
early warning and intelligence conduits would be placed under great pressure and the
command arrangement might not function as smoothly as designed.
The technical and regulatory changes that have redesigned the common carrier
network of telephone communication represents the fourth facet of the mature U.S. C2
system. The national communication system, established in 1963. was predicated upon a
common carrier telephone structure. The giant network of the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T) filled 85 per cent of government communication
requirements and 94 percent of its most crucial circuits through leased common carrier
lines. 112 The North America Air Defense Command (NORAD), the Strategic Air
Command (SAC), the Joint Cheifs of Staff (JCS), and presidential alerting systems af'e
dependent upon these lines. 113 Due to advancement in telephone switching technology
and economies of scale, "the network is far less distributed and redundant than it was
twenty years ago...less than twenty-five critical nodes handle the great bulk of military
communications." 114 The locations of these nodes are not classified and were thus
undoubtedly known and targeted by the forces of the Soviet Union. The divestment of
American Telephone &Telegraph (AT&T) in 1982 and the corresponding rise in
IIIbid. 215.
112O.S. Department of Defense, "Analysis of the Effects of AT&T Divestiture Upon National Defense
Security and Emergency Preparedness," June 1981, 5. in Bracken, 217.
113ibid. 6, in Bracken. 217.
114Bracken. 218.
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telecommunication competition has made "long-term network planning for defense a very
low priority."' 15
The final characteristic of the mature U.S. C2 system is the vulnerability of its
physical components. As the U.S. system of command and control expanded to keep
pace with the Cold War arms race and related requirements, it came to be realized that
much of the physical structures of the system (satellites, ground stations, command
bunkers, etc.) needed enhanced protection against assault (military strike, sabotage, or
effects on electronics by electro-magnetic pulse from nuclear detonation). The economic
cost to protect these systems, through redunomncy, hardening, etc., is enormous. Beyond
that, in all post-WWII command failings, the issue was never defective equipment. "The
real problems have been things like crossed lines of authority, confusion, inability of
standard operative procedures to solve problems. and an ineffective integration of
political and military decision making." 116 Bracken attributes this to the common
infatuation with the communication engineering aspects of command and control. 117
a. Vulnerabilities of the U.S. System
In order to complete the review of the U.S. C2 system, it is necessary to
further evaluate! other systemic deficiencies. Bruce Blair states that the primary mission
of the modem U.S. C2 system in time of crisis was to achieve a high level of damage
expectancy: "the ability in the face of any adversity io demolish the full spectrum of
targets in the former Soviet Union."' 118 As a result, targeting became the main engine that




1 18 Blair. 38.
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decentralization of nuclear release authority, or predelegation. Blair claims that "little
doubt exists that past presidents, beginning with Dwight D. Eisenhower, delegated to key
military commanders the authority to carry out nuclear war plans under some
circumstances." 1 19 In line with predelegation, civilian leadership permitted devolution of
nuclear operations policy to military planners. Such critical issues as target selection,
damage requirements, and assignment of weapons to meet such requirements were solely
the military's responsibility. 120 In sum, the extreme emphasis on targeting, combined
with a predelegative and decentralized command and control structure created a system
that is predisposed to rapidly bringing all nuclear forces to a high state of readiness. 121
The resulting imperative would then be launch on warning. This overall proclivity to
rapid generation of forces focused on launch on warning is what Blair believes makes the
U.S. C2 system inherently unstable.
b. The characteristics of the U.S. C2 system
From the above review the U.S. C2 system exhibits the following primary
characteristics. It is highly decentralized, technologically complex, emphasizes targeting
and maintains an aggressive, launch-on-warning posture.
c. Pros, cons and implications for stability
Due to its decentralization of release authorization, launch-on-warning
posture and numerous and varied delivery means 122, the U.S. has a high second-strike
capability. This reinforces deterrence which in turn leads to greater stability between the




122The nuclear triad: land-based bombers and ICBM fields plus ballistic missile submarines.
44
the C2 goal of reliability of forces, another beneficial aspect of the U.S. system is that it
addresses negative control as well. U.S. nuclear warheads are safe from accidental
detonation and secure against unauthorized deployment.12 Thus the U.S. system seeks
to address all three goals of C2.
As Blair has pointed out, however, the very characteristics which satisfy the
goal of reliability also make for a C2 system which may fail "deadly." Blair claims that
U.S. pre-delegation bolstered deterrence against premeditated attack. Unfortunately it
risked the chance for "military operations to overrun the intentions of the political
leadership and cause the unpremeditated use of nuclear weapons."1 24 Such a failure
would strike stability a severe blow.
2. The Soviet Model
Information on Soviet command and control has until recently been limited;
Bruce Blair has highlighted some of the most interesting aspects in his 1993 work, -he
Logic of Accidental Nuclear War. 125 He points out in great detail the numerous
safeguards used by the Soviets to achieve the goals of reliability, safety, and security.
a. Centralized C2 mechanisms
Blair divides Soviet C2 safeguards into those at the top of the C2 structure
and below. Similar to the U.S. system, two to three authorities are required for
authorization to launch nuclear weapons. The Soviets also employed two distinct modes
of operation for their C2 system: manual and crisis. In the manual mode, the
commanders-in-chief of the strategic forces are included in the authorization process. In
12 3Release control devices such as PALs and multiple-man control prevent unauthorized use. However. as
U.S. nuclear forces shift from peacetime to wartime alert levels, the degree of authority of lower-eschelon




crisis mode, when a breakdown in communication is feared, the CINCs are bypassed as
launch authorization is held solely by top Kremlin leaders.
Underpinning both manual and crisis modes of operation are the distinctly
Soviet concepts of permisive and direct commands. Permissive commands would be
sent from the heads of state to the General Staff and the CINCs as validation for the
CINCs to then issue direct commands to the nuclear weapons crews in the field. The
CINCs' direct command was not sufficient alone. The General Staff then also had to
forward a direct command to the weapons crews. At this juncture the two direct
commands were combined, validated, re-encrypted and retransmitted to the actual launch
crews. Finally, like their U.S. counterparts, top Soviet leaders used portable nuclear
suitcases or "footballs" which could be used quickly in times of crisis to provide
authorization for use of nuclear weapons.
Below the top echelon of Former Soviet leadership, Bruce Blair cites at least
six safeguards which were employed to prevent unsanctioned use of the nuclear
arsenal.' 26 The first was the use of two separate organizations and chains of command:
one managed the nuclear forces from a technical perspective while the other provided
military direction to the actual combat units. A second safeguard was the standard
procedure of maintaining nuclear weapons separate from their delivery units. Another
standard practice was the use of a two-person control mechanism in every aspect of
weapo.is handling. A fourth practice was the use of elaborate feedback loops which
enabled subordinate groups to be closely monitored by higher echelons. 127 The Soviets
also used an extensive electronic network which enabled top leadership to disable launch




Soviets made great use of blocking devices which would physically prevent the
unsanctioned use of nuclear weapons. 128 The end result of all of these command and
control policies and safeguards was to produce a Soviet C2 structure that was highly
centralized.
b. Soviet fear of decapitation
While the Soviets were extremely concerned with negative control of their
nuclear arsenal, they also took seriously the threat to C2 decapitation.129 As a result, vast
sums were expended to create redundancy and robustness within the command system.
Examples of Soviet efforts to enhance the reliability of their C2 system are ground-
mobile and airborne command centers, deep and hardened bunkers for top state leaders,
multiple and EMP-hardened communication lines between C2 centers and the nuclear
forces, even rockets that would deploy communications equipment in the midst of a
nuclear attack. 130
c. Characteristics
Emerging information on the Soviet C2 system indicates that it was highly
centralized, redundant and robust.
d. Pros, cons and implications for stability
Like the U.S. model, the Soviets maintained a nuclear C2 system that
appeared to be highly reliable; chances were slim for a completely successful pre-emptive
strike. 131 This served deterrence and stability. Soviet emphasis on centralization also
12 8Similar to U.S. PALs. these code-activated devices were controlled by top Kremlin leaders to prohibit
unauthorized use.
129 Blair, pp. 124-127.
130See Blair, 78.
131IU.S. nuclear planners believed the Soviet C2 system to be highly resilient to either pre-emption or
decapitation. See Blair, 121.
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enhanced stability. While the intrusive devices made reaction slow, and contributed
greatly to Soviet fear of decapitation, at least this type of C2 system was likely to fail
"safely."
At the present time in Russia, the nuclear inheritor of the Soviet Union,
there is much concern over the physical security of the arsenal. One of the main reasons
for Soviet centralization of command was a lack of faith in the lower-echelon troops
which operated the nuclear warheads. Under a tightly controlled state security system
that the Soviets maintained prior to December of 1991, troop loyalty was not a critical
factor. Since that time however, internal security has declined with the erosion of the
Communist Party and KGB apparatuses. Also, the power of the Russian mafia has
increased. Troop loyalty is now a big issue, for some fear that the physical security of
Russia's nuclear arsenal is at risk. Unlike the U.S. military, which is a volunteer and
highly professional force, the forces of the former Soviet Union were conscripted and for
some years have been disgruntled due to acute housing shortages and the decline of the
military's prestige. Seymour Hersh believes that some of these troops guarding the
Russian nuclear arsenal are vulnerable to bribery.132 The possibility of warhead theft
does not bode well for stability.
3. The India-Pakistan Model
There are other nuclear states in the world beyond the Big Five. An examination
of how some of these states have perceived their C2 as distinct from the typical Western




a. Why a South Asia Model?
There are three reasons why the nuclear operations in India and Pakistan are
relevant to a discussion of C2 models. First, the South Asian concept of "non-
weaponized deterrence" offers a unique and differing C2 approach to the more traditional
U.S. and Soviet models. Also, the regional rivalry between Pakistan and India is likely to
be similar to that of other new or potential nuclear states. Finally, these states conduct
their nuclear operations under the resource constraints likely to be encountered by new
and emerging nuclear states.
1) A third alternative
While it seems evident that both India and Pakistan possess the requisite
material to construct nuclear weapons, it is unclear whether or not either country has
assembled the various components into deployable devices. In fact, George Perkovich
believes that the ad-hoc policies of maintaining unassembled nuclear devices in the
arsenals of India and Pakistan may be described as "non-weaponized deterrence." 133
Despite the absence of complete weapons, India and Pakistan have the capability to
assemble and deploy nuclear weapons in short order 13 4 By the end of 1991, It was
extimated that India possessed enough plutonium for the construction of 50 to 60
weapons. 1 35 Pakistan may have ý .ough highly enriched uranium to have produced 6 to
10 weapons. 1 3 6 Pakistan and India also have the means to deploy nuclear weapons.
Both countries possess advanced fixed-wing aircraft that may be modified to deliver
133George Perkovich. "A Nuclear Third Way in South Asia." ForeignPolic, No. 91. Summer 1993, 88.
134 Woolsey testimony
13 5David Albright, Frans Berkhout and Willian Walker, World Inventory of Plutonium and Highly
Enriched Uraium. 1992, (New York: Oxford University Press. 1J99), pp. 157-162.
1361bid, pp. 162-67.
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nuclear free-fall bombs. Additionally, short and medium range ballistic missiles
currently exist in each country's military arsenals and both states are seeking more
advanced missile technology to improve range and payload capacity. 137
2) Situational similarities
Pakistan, like other new or potential nuclear states, faces a regional rival
which possesses a superior military force. Both Pakistan and India have weak
economies, and as a result, are seeking defense on the cheap. Pakistan and India face not
only external security threats but internal as well. In Pakistan, civil disobedience in the
Sindh province has a long history.138 The potential for Sindhi secession also exists.139
Pakistan has a history of unstable civil-military relations.14°
3) South Asian command and control
Similar to other new nuclear states, substantial literature does not exist
about the actual C2 structures of Pakistan and India. A fair amount is known about what
these countries do not have, at least according to the criticisms of former high-ranking
military officers of both states. Two prominent critics of India's nuclear operations are
retired generals V. K. Nair and K. Sundarji. In Pakistan, retired general A. Beg is the
primary critic. South Asia proliferation specialist Tim McCarthy claims that both Nair
and Sundarji are taken quite seriously by other active duty military officers in India.141
137 perkovich, 86. Pakistan has the HATF I and II but may have aquired components for China's M-I I
medium-range missile. See Ann Devroyand R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Evidence 'Suggests' China Breaks
Arms Pact," Wshinaton.Pos 18 May 1993. India possesses the short-range Prithvi and is developing the
intermediate-range Agni.
138Raju G. C. Thomas, South Asian Security in the 1990's, (London: IISS. 1993), 3.
139 1bid. 3.
14 0 See Stephen P. Cohen. The Pakistan Army, (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1984). pp.
105-133.
14 1Conversation with Tim McCarthy, Center For Non-Proliferation Studies, MIIS, 20 February 1994.
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As substantiation to that claim, a prominent Indian military journal recently reviewed
Sundarji's book. Blind Men of Hindoostan, a novel critical of Indian nuclear operations.
and gave it praise for its applicability. 142
To improve their C2 structures, India and Pakistan need to fill a few gaps
in their respective nuclear weapons posture. Both countries lack three generic areas of
concern for an enhanced C2 system: doctrine, specific organizations, and command and
control systems. The first is a clear, formalized doctrine for the employment of nuclear
weapons. Former Chief of the Indian Army, General K. Sundarji, strongly advocates a
doctrine of minimum deterrence for India and Pakistan.143 In Nuclear India, V. K. Nair,
the former Deputy Director of Strategic Planning at Indian Army Headquarters, outlines
in some detail the requirements for an Indian nuclear strategic doctrine. Assuming
weapons capability, three necessary areas are declaration, deployment, and
employment.144 In relation to declaration, Nair writes, " the element of fear that has to be
perceived (nuclear deterrence) must be communicated by deliberate statements that
elaborate the capabilities in being. It is absolutely vital to make the official stand of the
government credible if the strategy is to work." 145 In Pakistan, General Mirza Aslam Beg
echoes Sundarji and Nair; he believes that "it is myth that nuclear secrecy enhances
14 2Review of K. Sundarju's Blind Men oi Hindoostan: Indo-Pak Nuclear War, (New Dehli: UBS
Publishers, 1993) by Maj. Gen. Rajendra Nath (Retd.), in Defence Today, Vol. 1(1), August 1993. pp. 149-
151.
143K. Sundarji, "Regional Arms Reduction and Limitation in the Post-Cold War Era: South Asia," EM
Presented at International Conference on Controlling Arms, 7-10 June 1993, Richmond. Virginia. 3.
1




security." 146 Such "opacity," as it is called, may lead to suspicion, fear, and mistrust by
each side for the other which could lead to unpredictable behavior with nuclear
weapons. 147 In his view, both undeclared nuclear weapons states are exacerbating
regional instability by their secrecy.
Besides maintaining an undeclared nuclear weapons status, India and
Pakistan lack policies of deployment. According to Nair, the actual stationing of India's
nuclear weapons, or at least components, has not been well developed. The core rationale
of a developed deployment policy is to "provide credibility to the declaratory policy."148
In other words, if the weapons are not deployed, and Pakistan understands this, then
deterrence is weakened. Lastly, the issue of employment of nuclear weapons needs to be
codified. Nair proposes a number of categories of targets for nuclear weapons. They
include striking an opponent's war-making potential, manpower resources, industrial
infrastructure and economic base, communications facilities and C2 structures.149
Essentially, India has a limited or non-existent targeting philosophy. This is much
different from the U.S. regime in which targeting drives the existing apparatus.
Not only do Pakistan and India lack basic policy doctrines like targeting,
deployment and declarative stance, but also organizations and administrative structures to
formulate and execute nuclear policy. The first of Nair's imperatives for India's nuclear
regime is the "institutionalization of a body of 'specialists' solely committed to this task
14 6Mirja Aslamn Beg, "Pakistan's Nuclear Programme: A National Security Perspective," Foundation for
Research on National Develoment and Security, no date, 21.
1471bid.
14 8Nair, 86.
149Nair discusses this point in depth, pp. 85-86.
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(nuclear doctrine formulation) and directly responsible to the cabinet."'150 India and
Pakistan also suffer from rather undefined National Command Authorities (NCA). In
India. the Prime Minister retains ultimate release authority' 51 while in Pakistan it would
appear to be held by the senior military officer(s) and possibly the President. 152 The
NCA's of both countries need to be broadened to include more people in the inner
sanctum of the compliance procedure before release authority is granted. For India, Nair
further recommends specialized staff support be afforded to the Prime Minister and other
NCA elites. Some of the tasks for such staff include: "threat assessment, development of
nuclear policy options, collation and synthesis of intelligence, policy for security of
nuclear forces, etc." 153 If India is considered deficient in these areas, Pakistan may be as
well.
The final elements that are missing in the nuclear regimes of India and
Pakistan are specific structures of a C2 system. Such structures need to be considered in
the categories of command on one side and control on the other. Pakistani General
Aslam Beg advocates "the setting up of elaborate command, control and communications
structures as was done by the US and ex-USSR during the Cold War days."'154 General
Sundarji states that for India, areas requiring attention are: "improving C3, the national
command post and the alternative national command post; warhead safety and control to








similarly asserts that India's "C31 infrastructure would need substantial improvements
with a special effort to make communications redundant and (improve) increments in the
electronic early warning components."'156
b. Characteristics
The main characteristic of the South Asian model, as derived from the
criticisms of the former generals, is that of technical and procedural simplicity. The
description of this condition is the concept of non-weaponized deterrence, where the
nuclear weapons remain stored in a disassembled state.
c. Pros, cons and implications for stability
The South Asian model's primary advantage in simplicity is that weapons
are not on the launchpad or alert strip waiting to be released at the first sign of tactical
warning. As a result, the likelihood that the system will fail "deadly" during periods of
reduced tensions is low. This lower level of nuclear preparedness bolsters stability.
This could change, however as interstate tensions increase and the two states transition
from a peacetime to a wartime footing As generals Sundarji and Nair have stated, the
lack of early warning and intelligence systems and nuclear operations doctrine indicates
that state leaders may be operating in the blind while lower-level commanders will
conduct operations during crises on an ad hoc basis. Without more codified procedures
and C2 exercises, the chances are good that operator error could occur, possibly to the
extent of releasing weapons. Thus under stress, the system would be poised to fail
"deadly." This of course would adversely effect regional stability. Somewhat differently,
these factors could convince one side that the other's C2 is deficient enough to warrant a
decapitative or pre-emptive strike. Whether or not such a strike took conventional or
nuclear form would matter little: hostilities would have broken out with enhanced
156Nair, 126.
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possibilities for nuclear exchanges. In this way, a state's C2 system could fail "deadly"
through he indirect route of inviting a decapitative strike by a rival.
C. CONCLUSION
This chapter's review of the U.S., Soviet and South Asian models for command and
control have revealed that each model has differing C2 system characteristics and
implications for stability. Figure 3 depicts how the various C2 models fall out
characteristically.
Characteristics U.S. Soviet S. Asia
Centralization High Low Med
few release persons no yes yes
ability to release from center no yes no
troop loyalty yes no yes
feedback mechanisms yes yes no
Technical Sophistication High High Low
redundant. robust comms yes yes no
early warning, intelligence systems yes yes no
hardened C2 nodes yes yes no
EMP hardening yes yes no
weapons safeguards yes yes yes
Procedural Complexity High High Low
personnel reliability screening yes unk no
multi-person control yes yes unk
system exercises yes yes no
codified procedures and training yes yes no
"learning mechanisms" yes yes no
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Fig. 3 Characteristics of C2
Now that the "framework for C2 development," the "checklist for stable C2" and the
three models of C2 styles have been developed, it is time to apply them to a specific new
nuclear state about which very little is known, Ukraine.
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IV: UKRAINE'S EVOLVING C2 SYSTEM
Having discussed in Chapter H1 some of the determinants which work to fashion a C2
structure, and having displayed three models of C2 in chapter HI, it is now time to
evaluate the implications for stability that a new nuclear state's C2 might have. This
chapter will evaluate Ukraine's C2 structure. While an examination of Ukraine's C2
vulnerabilities and potential failure modes qualifies as a fruitful exercise in its own right.
it is to be remembered that a similar analysis could be done on any new or potential
nuclear state: the general framework and "checklist for stable C2" are generally
applicable.
This chapter will first explain why Ukraine is a significant case study. It will then
describe the Ukrainian C2 structure based on the "framework for C2 development" and
other sources of information. Once a general outline is formed, the "checklist for stable
C2" will be applied to it and implications for stability explored. Finally, a suggestive
strategy to limit C2 vulnerabilities in Ukraine will be proposed.
A. THE SELECTION OF UKRAINE
Ukraine proves to be a fruitful point of departure in the study of the potential effects
of C2 systems in new nuclear states on stability for several reasons. Ukraine in unique in
that it is one of only four states (Belarus and Kazakhstan and Russia being the other
three) to have inherited nuclear arsenals literally overnight.157 Unlike Belarus and
157 Major elements of the Soviet 46th Air Army and the 43rd Strategic Rocket forces Army were based in
Ukraine as the state claimed its independence from the USSR in August 1991. These forces were believed
to have possessed approximately 1768 nuclear warheads for strategic use (cruise missiles on
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Kazakhstan, Ukraine toyed with the idea of gaining operation, or launch, control over its
inherited arsenal. 158 Although Ukraine has agreed to denuclearize under the terms of the
Trilateral Statement of January 14, 1994. its temporary intransigencc created an
enormous stir within western arms control circles. As a result, Ukraine's capability to
command and control its inherited nuclear weapons became a major issue. 159 Interest
over implications for C2 stability should be taken seriously. Christoph Bluth makes the
point that Russia's nuclear transportation network is capable of removing all of the
nuclear warheads from Ukrainian soil by the end of 1994.160 Why the Ukrainians
bargained for a three year time-table under the Trilateral Statement is unclear if viewed
separately from its security needs
Considering Ukraine's security challenges vis-a-vis Russia, its flagging economy,
further attempts to operationalize some segments of its nuclear inheritance cannot yet be
ruled out. 16 1 Ukraine may elect to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons capability
intercontinental bombers and inter-continental ballistic missiles). See John Lepingwell, "Beyond START:
Ukrainian-Russian negotiations," RFE-RL Research Report 2, No. 8 (19 Feb 93), 46-58.
158 See Appendix A for a fuller account of Ukraine's efforts to this end. This argument continues as to
whether Ukraine deshed operational control in order to use them as a military asset or simply for
international attention and prestige. On this issue see Martin J. Dewing, "Ukraine: Nuclear Weapons
Capacity Rising," Master's thesis, (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), June 1993.
159 Even so, the issue with proliferation pessimists is not so much with a new nuclear state having a viable
C2 system as over concern over the continuance of the NPT regime in general. Lecture by Stephen Miller
at Monterey Institute of International Studies. February 1994.
160 Christoph Bluth (University of Essex) and Anton Surikov and Igor Sutyagin, (Institute for U.S. and
Canada. Moscow). Unpublished manuscript, Spring 1994, p. 5.
161 Vladimir Pikaev, a senior fellow at the Institute for World Economy and International Relations in
Moscow (a branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences) stated in a personal interview that some former
Soviet gravity bombs may not be accounted f )r and would make good opportunities for exploitation would
Ukraine seek an independent nuclear weapons capability in the near-term. Interview at MIIS, 4 May 1994.
Similarly, William Potter believes that of four possible tracks that Ukraine could pursue to obtain fissile
materials to construct a nuclear weapon, unaccounted gravity bombs is one way. Interview at the Center
for Nonproliferation, MILS, 6 May 1994.
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after the stipulations of the Trilateral Statement have been fulfilled. While the point of
the chapter is not to demonstrate whether Kiev will pursue such an option or not, it is a
relevant issue and deserves consideration.
- Ukraine's Nuclear Future
Despite the ratification of the Trilateral Statement and START I by the
Ukrainian Rada, a denuclearizeb Ukraine is not a foregone conclusion. Even if Ukraine
in good faith adheres to the principles of the Trilateral Statement, nuclear warheads will
remain on Ukrainian territory and under Ukrainian administrative control until at least
1997. Pursuing a different option, however, Ukraine may conclude that its brief
experience with the inherited Soviet nuclear arsenal taught it at least one important
lesson: a nuclear weapons-capable state receives a high degree of international attention,
particularly from the United States.162 Ukraine is still confronted by many of the
constraints which influenced many Ukrainian officials to consider an independent nuclear
capability: a deteriorating economy, ethnic animosities, a decaying military and
increased Russian bellicosity. While short and long-term Western financial assistance and
security cooperation is desired by Kiev, they do not represent absolute guarantees of
continued Ukrainian independence. As a result, the possibility that Ukraine may seek to
possess some form of nuclear weapons capability cannot be ruled out. If this turns out to
be Kiev's thinking, what form might such capability take? If Ukraine has learned any
other lesson from its time as a de-facto nuclear proliferator, it may be that the overt
admission of possession of nuclear weapons generates too much international attention.
Ukraine may have observed that international arms control agencies have a much more
162See Martin Dewing, "Ukraine: Independent Nuclear Weapons Capability Rising," Master's Thesis,
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School), June 1993, pp. 89-96.
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difficult time with the "undeclared" nuclear states of the world such as North Korea at the
present time. Thus, Ukraine may elect to re-emerge as an "opaque" nuclear proliferator.
- Status of Ukrainian nuclear technology and industrial infrastructure.
In order to determine whether Ukraine might opt for nuclear opacity, it is
first required to explore what Ukraine can do in the realm of nuclear weapons production.
Ukraine currently has only two sources of weapo- 7ssionable
material: in the warheads of its inherited nuclear arsenal and in its civilian nuclear power
plants: Chernobyl, Zaporozhia, and Khmelnitski.1 63 Uranium is indigenous to Ukraine;
with approximately 350,000 tons of uranium, Ukraine's deposit is the fifth largest in the
world. 164 Ukraine does not, however, have a uranium reprocessing facility to develop
highly enriched uranium (HEU). On the other hand, plutonium is a by-product of the
fission process within nuclear power plants. Thus while it would take time, enough
plutonium could be extracted from spent fuel rods to use in atomic devices. Ukraine also
has the technical wherewithal to construct a plutonium reprocessing facility to enrich the
plutonium to weapons-grade quality. 165 A number of uranium conversion plants exist in
Ukraine which produce virtually all other elements required to construct nuclear
weapons.166 One crucial ingredient, tritium, is not available indigenously in Ukraine.
Tritium is indigenous to Russia and Kazakhstan, but only Kazakhstan has a tritium
processing plant.
163Wilhia Potter, Nuclear Profiles of the Soviet Successor States, (Monterey, CA: MIIS, 1993), pp. 84-
87.
164Rostislav Khotin, Reuters, 10 April 1992, in Monterey Institute for International Studies Non-
Proliferation Review, 93.
165Dr. Oleg Bukharin. Center For Energy and Environmental Studies, Princeton University; interview 5
May 1994.
16 6 Potter, Nuclea PrEofles, 89.
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In the realm of intellectual capacity, some of the most advanced
institutions in the Soviet Union for physics, mathematics and nuclear weapons design are
located in Ukraine. Some of these include the Khar'kov Scientific Center (Monolit), the
Khartron Scientific and Productior Association and the ICBM production plant in
Dniprepetrovsk, where SS-24's were produced.167 Many Ukrainian scientists were
integral in the design and construction of some of the Soviet Union's most advanced
nuclear weapons, delivery vehicles, and guidance systems.
When taken in sum, it is clear that Ukraine possess most, if not all,
components and materials to construct nuclear weapons. Many of the Soviet Union's
pre-eminent nuclear scientists also reside in Ukraine. This evidence indicates that
Ukraine has the potential to develop an indigenous nuclear weapons capability in the near
term. Whether or not Kiev will exercise the political will to construct nuclear weapons is
another matter.
Ukraine is also faced with internal and external threats to its security and
thus threats to Kiev's ability to command and control its nuclear forces. Since claiming
sovereignty is 1991, there has been continued debate on the disposition of the some 13
million ethnic Russian living in Ukraine. There has been discussion on dividing Ukraine
in half, roughly along lines of the Dnieper River. Fea-s of a Crimean secession
abound. 168 Externally Ukraine faces a seemingly more adventurist Russia, where figures
such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky call for Russian intervention to protect Russian nationals in
the near abroad. 169
167Ibid, 84.
168 Steven Erlanger, "Ukraine Chief Accuses Yeltsin," New York Times. 25 May 94. A7.
169Celestine Bohlen. "Zhirinovsky Cult Grows: All Power to the Leader," New York Times, 5 April 1994,
Al.
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A final reason that Ukraine makes a good case study of C2 as it relates to
stability is that Ukraine struggles with civil-military relations. Christoph Bluth claims
that Kiev has only tenuous control over some elements of the Ukrainian military. 170
B. UKRAINE'S EVOLVING NUCLEAR C2 STRUCTURE
The case has been made that Ukraine may elect to develop an independent nuclear
weapons capability. It has also been pointed out that the moment a state develops a
nuclear weapon, it instantaneously has a de facto nuclear C2 system, whether planned for
or not. As a result, it is important to international security to attempt to define, to the
extent possible, the form that Ukraine's C2 may take. The particular interest in Ukraine's
nuclear C2 is its potential to fail and adversely effect regional and international stability.
In order to define and evaluate a C2 system such as Ukraine's (which may not yet
exist), it is necessary to use the analytical tools developed in chapter II of this thesis.
First, the general "framework for C2 development" will be applied to Ukraine to identify
the likely outlines of its C2 system. the determinants affecting a new nuclear state's C2
development have implications for stability; these will be explored using the Ukrainian
context. Next, deductive and comparative analysis, based upon the real-world C2 models
examined in chapter IIl, will be applied to Ukraine to further flesh out the outlines of its
C2 structure. Finally, the "checklist for stable C2" will be applied to Ukraine to identify
inherent vulnerabilities which could directly lead to a C2 failure with significant
implications for stability.
170Christoph Bluth. "Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: Safety and Security Aspects,
unpublished manuscript, no date. 29. For an in-depth look at the potential for lack of control in the Russian
Republic see Seymour M. Hersh. "The Wild East," AtlantRiMotly June 1994, pp. 61-68.
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1. Application of the "Framework For C2 Development" to Ukraine
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter. Ukraine is well-suited to develop
nuclear weapons should it exercise the political will to do so. As a result, Ukraine makes
for a good case study upon which to overlay the "framework for C2 development" to
evaluate its usefulness as an analytical tool for defining the obscure C2 systems of new
nuclear states.
a. Pattern of Civil.Military Relations
During the time when Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union, the military
forces of the Soviet Union located in Ukraine were subordinate to Moscow, not Kiev.
During this period bipolarity was the order of the day so security threats emanated from
the West, not the East. As a result, civil-military relations in the Ukrainian SSR were
stable.
This has changed dramatically since Ukraine's independence and the
collapse of the USSR in 1991. Multipolarity has become a reality in Eastern Europe and
Ukraine has had to reconsider its security challenges. Many security analysts, both in
Ukraine and the West, have come to view Moscow as the primary external threat to
Ukrainian sovereignty.17 1 Issues of troop loyalty to either Kiev or Moscow have
emerged and continue to be conteptious. 172 Amidst the military restructuring in Ukraine,
para-miliary units have developed whose loyalty to either capitol may be suspect.t 73
Ukraine's civil-military relations have thus moved from stable to potentially volatile.
171See "Still on the Prowl," hg,.. Eonmist, Vol. 328, No. 7826. 28 August 1993, 11.
172Chrystia Freeland, "Ukrainian Calls for Allegiance Oath," W. g 11 April 1993. A24 and
"Morozov: Ukraine to Issue Oath for Strategic Forces." FBIS-SOV-93-068, 12 April 1993, 47.
173Bluth, "Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union." 29.
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This impacts Ukraine's C2 development in that it would influence Kiev to adopt assertive
control over its nuclear weapons. This could result in a "safe" C2 failure.
b. Time-Urgency
Ukraine is geographically positioned next to Russia, its primary rival.
Ukraine thus would have little or not warning of a Russian pre-emptive strike upon its
nuclear forces. Additionally, Ukraine is likely to have a small nuclear arsenal based upon
its resource limitations and the concept of existentiai deterrence: only a few weapons
need exist to deter. While its geographic expanse is not as small as some new nuclear
states such as Pakistan's, it is neither as broad as Russia's. As a result of these factors.
Kiev would most likely be highly concerned about the survivability of its nuclear arsenal
from possible attack. this could lead to Kiev's adoption of a predelegated to decentralized
C2 system. The serious implication for stability is that decentralized systems are more
prone to failing "deadly."
c. Internal Threats
Ukraine faces three of the sub-categories of internal threats postulated by the
framework: separatist movements (Crimea, Russian nationals), protest groups (anti-
nuclear advocates), and cultural hatreds (Ukrainians, Rus\mJwo, Crimean Tatars). These
potentially de-stabilizing factors work together to in- , e the construction of an
assertive or centralized C2 system.
d. Resource Limitations
As indicated previously, Ukraine is in dire economic straits at the present
time. Should Kiev decide to pursue a nuclear weapons capability, it might be forced to
forego several technical safeguards for budgetary reasons. Ukraine's military budget
naturally feels the money pinch as well. Ukrainian troops, like their Russian
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counterparts, are faced with housing shortages and inadequate financial compensation. 174
The lack of technical safeguards (PALs, 1-point safe mechanisms. etc.) could lead to
failures in negative control which could lead to accidental or inadvertent deployment of
detonation of nuclear weapons. Inadequacies felt by Ukrainian forces could lead to
conditions ripe for bribery, which also adversely effects negative control.
e. Need for Secrecy
Ukraine's experience with its inherited nuclear arsenal has demonstrated that
world opinion is against any new nuclear state which publicly claims or advocates
weapons capability. Thus it is likely that should Ukraine go nuclear, it would do so as an
opaque nuclear weapons state. If so, many of the components normally considered
essential to stable nuclear operations, doctrine, testing, exercises, early warning, etc.,
would be forfeit in the interests of secrecy. As a result, Ukraine's de facto C2 system
would leave national leaders in the dark about external threats while lower-echelon
commanders would be conducting nuclear operations on an ad-hoc basis. Kiev would
have little foundation for confidence in its weapons or its C2 system. This could lead to a
"use-it-or-lose-it" posture. Without adequate intelligence such a posture could lead to
premature use, with obvious disastrous effects on regional and international stability.
In sum, three of the five determinants within the "framework for C2
development indicate that Ukraine's C2 would be decentralized and likely to fail
"deadly." Moreover, the determinants do not carry equal weight. Likely to be the most
important to Kiev are time-urgency, resource limitations and the need for secrecy. These
happen to be the ones most indicative of a decentralized system with the propensity to fail
"deadly."
174 Corruption is also reported to be high within the ranks. See Oleg Stekal, "No Way to Run an Army,"
The Bulletin of the Atomic Sciences, 34.
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2. Deductive and Comparative Analysis
A second step towards defining Ukraine's existing or future C2 system is to
acknowledge its Soviet heritage. This heritage has both a hardware and a software
aspect. First, as described in Chapter IIl under the Soviet model, the Soviets had
established a massive C2 complex; some of those elements reached into Ukraine to
command and control Soviet nuclear forces there. These elements consisted of C2
bunkers, missile silos, weapons depots and the communication linkages between them.
These physical structures remain in place.175 As mentioned previously, important early
warning and intelligence cuing elements were not inherited by Ukraine. The software
aspect is that the personnel within the C2 chain were trained in the Soviet Union under
Soviet philosophies of C2. As a result, these people, from the National Command
Authority down to the military personnel actually conducting day to day nuclear
operations, are going to conduct such operations the only way they know how: following
Soviet patterns. Knowing what we do of the Soviet model, Ukrainian C2 would likely
take a centralized shape.
From the perspective of Soviet heritage alone, it seems that Ukrainian C2 would
logically tend to function similarly to how Soviet C2 functioned. However, there may
exist some parallels to the U.S. C2 system. For instance, during the early "development
phase" of U.S. nuclear operations, the president maintained practically direct control over
the small U.S. nuclear arsenal. It is very likely that in Ukraine today or in the future, its
nuclear force would be quite small, due to resource limitations. To protect its secrecy, a
very limited number of personnel would know of its existence. Even fewer would be
175The strategic weapons of the 43rd SRF are located at Khmel'nitskiy and Pervomysk. The weapons for
the strategic bombers are located at two airfields: Uzin and Prilavki. The C2 headquarters is located a
Vinnitsya. William H. Kincade, "Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: Hollow Threat, Wasting Asset," ArMs
Contrl Tday, July/August 1993, 14.
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entrusted with release authorization- most likely only the president, prime minister or
defense minister. This arrangement would indicate a high degree of centralization.
The South Asian model provides a couple of clues. Unlike the U.S. and Soviet
models, the C2 structures of India and Pakistan do not appear to be reliant upon
technological sophistication.176 This relative simplicity of form suits Ukraine at the
present time due to the lack of economic resources able to be dedicated to C2 needs. 177
A second clue, related to sophistication, concerns intelligence collection and
processing capabilities. General Nair states that a major hurdle for Indian C2 "lies in the
realm of early warning and attack assessment."' 178 Essentially, any C2 system is blind if
unable to perceive and assess enemy actions. Ukraine's position in this area of C2 is
curious. While it inherited some elements of the sophisticated Soviet C2 system
(bunkers, storage depots, missile silos, etc.), it did not inherit the corresponding
intelligence aspect. Under the Soviet Union, all intelligence, generally controlled by the
KGB and the GRU (military intelligence), was directed from the periphery inwards to
Moscow. 179 Thus Kiev was not connected to this intelligence network. As a result, Kiev
is now faced with initiating an indigenous intelligence network from scratch.180 This
leaves Kiev susceptible to KGB penetration into its nuclear operations. Ukraine would
176 Sundarji, Nair and Beg refer to the technical inadequacies of their respective countries' C2 systems.
17 7 Until recently, Ukraine's monthly inflation rate has averaged 90 percent. During the winter months
energy for heating was rationed. Jane Perlez, "Economic Collapse Leaves Ukraine With Little to Trade But
its Weapons," New York Times, 14 January 1994, A5.
17 8 Nair, 191.
179Bair, 67.
18 0 0ne U.S. analyst made the point that Ukraine's nuclear intelligence apparatus is much further behind
Pakistan and India's. India and Pakistan have had nuclear operations ongoing for many years, with concern
about preventive conventional attacks on their respective nuclear facilities. Interview 24 May 1994.
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also be vulnerable to Russian Spetsnaz attack on its C2 structure. In the realms of
technical and intelligence simplicity, Ukraine is similar to the South Asia model.
Through the use of deductive and comparative analysis. the probable shape of a
Ukrainian C2 system is beginning to emerge. From its Soviet legacy, it would tend to be
centralized. Compared to the early U.S. model, Ukraine's C2 would be controlled by a
small group within the government and military, and these elites would have direct
control over the nuclear forces: again, centralization. Unlike the superpower models,
Ukraine is similar to the South Asian C2 model due to lack of complexity, in the areas of
both technology and intelligence.
3. Another Perspective
Vladimir Pikaev offers a more specific description of Ukraine's nuclear C2
structure. He states that the nuclear chain of command in Ukraine runs from the president
to the defense minister to the "Center of Administrative Control Over Strategic Nuclear
Forces," or TsAUSyAS.' 81 From this command center the line of authority branches off
to both of the strategic force organizations in Ukraine, the 46th Air Army and the 43rd
Missile Army (see Figure 4). Pikaev concurs with other reports that Ukraine has
achieved administrative control over its strategic forces. Pikaev defines administrative
control as the ability to exercise negative control over the arsenal: weapons cannot be
deployed without Kiev's approval.18 2 He further believes that Ukraine has achieved
18 1Vladimir Pikaev is a senior fellow at the Institute For World Economics and International Relations
(part of the Russian Academy of Sciences) in Moscow. He has studied Russian and former Soviet C2 for
many years. According to Pikaev. TsAUSyAS is a Russian acronym. Interview, 4 May 1994. See also
John Lepingweil, "The Control of Former Soviet Nuclear Weapons: A Chronology," BBL Rserc
Sn2 No. 8, (19 February 1993), 72.
182See also John Lepingwell, "Beyond START: Ukrainian-Russian Negotiations," RFE-RL Research
Report,2, No. 8, (19 February 1993), 55. Also Blair. 87.
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46th Air Army 43rd Missile Army
Fig. 4 Possible Ukrainian Nuclear C2
4. Unorthodox Command and Control?
While Pikaev makes a interesting argument, it is not yet clear precisely how far
beyond administrative control of its nuclear forces that Ukraine has proceeded. It is
generally thought that had Ukraine truly been close to obtaining full operational control
of the nuclear forces it inherited, Russia would have raised a tremendous objection or
have conducted military operations to have destroyed or confiscated the weapons. 184 As
this has not occurred there is much uncertainty about how much control the Ukrainians
have over the strategic systems. It is for this reason that it was postulated that Ukraine
18 3 U'auiaians could therefore attempt to utilize the warheads on the strategic systems to make gravity
bombs deployable on Ukrainian tactical aircraft such as the Su-22 Fencer, which Ukraine possesses. By
late 1992 Ukrainian administrative control was thought to have extended to the military personnel
responsible for guarding he warheads. See Jeffrey Smith, "Officials See Shift in Ukraine's Nuclear
Position," Wi ,n~gtn , 19 December 1992, A10.
184For a detailed study of Russia's military options in this regard, see James E. Doyle, "Russian Uses Of
Force Against Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine: A Scenario-Based Analysis," Contract Paper for Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, 16 July 1993.
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might opt for opaque nuclear weapon status based upon indigenously-produced weapons.
The issue becomes this: if Ukraine develops nuclear weapons. will its nuclear C2 system
function to make those weapons reliable, safe and secure, thereby promoting regional
stability? Or will this system contain inherent vulnerabilities that could emerge
unexpectedly to produce a systemic failure leading to escalation into a nuclear exchange?
These are the questions that must be asked of C2 systems in all new nuclear states.
Ukrainian leaders may be satisfied with the level of C2 they believe their future system
will provide. Yet in reality the system may be waiting to fail the moment enough tension
is applied. This could transform Kiev's possible confidence in existential deterrence into
nuclear holocaust should the C2 system fail deadly. To determine whether or not this is a
likelihood, the "checklist for stable C2" needs to be applied to Ukraine.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY
At this point Ukrainian nuclear C2 has been investigated in three ways: through the
application of the "framework for C2 development," deductive and comparative analysis
to the U.S., Soviet and South Asian models of C2, and by a review of Vladimir P"kz.w's
description. Each of these analyses reveal implications for stability.
Under the "framework," it appears that Ukraine is more likely to develop a de-
centralized C2 system which focuses on the goal of force reliability. Evaluated
deductively, it would seem that Ukraine would follow its Soviet predecessor and develop
a more centralized system with intrusive, assertive control mechanisms in place.
Compared to the South Asian model, Ukraine would forgo technical and procedural
complexity due to resource limitations and the need for secrecy of its weapons program.
Pikaev believes that the system is very centralized but also very unstable.
Taken together, these approaches reveal conflicting signals as to what form Ukraine's
nuclear C2 might take. This is not surprising considering the original goals of C2
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explored in chapter 1I of this thesl i. The heart of C2 formulation is to achieve and ideal
balance between the goals of reliability, safety and security, it is and ideal balance
because it can never be totally achieved. As a C2 system seeks to gain more reliability.
say through pre-delegation of release authority or dispersal of weapons, safety and
security are compromised.
To make more specific predictions about how Ukraine, or any new nuclear state,
might fail in its attempt to fashion a balance C2 system is difficult, empirical data is very
scarce. Yet further evaluation is required to try to identify specific vulnerabilities in V2
systems that could trigger significant C2 failures. While such an evaluation will be
speculative, it will open up new avenues of additional inquiry that may be pursued to
greater degrees as information becomes available. The "checklist for stable C2" as a tool
that may be applied to a new nuclear state to open up such an investigation.
D. APPLICATION OF "CHECKLIST FOR STABLE C2" TO UKRAINE
As stated in Chapter II, the "checklist" may be divided into two areas of
investigation: hardware and software issues.
1. Hardware Issues.
The first area to be examined is that of communications. Does Ukraine have
lines of communications between the National Command Authority and its nuclear forces
that are reliable and secure? It has been established that President Kravchuk has achieved
at least negative control over the nuclear forces on Ukrainian territory. Thus, some form
of communication exists between Kiev and the missile and air fields. 18 5 What remains
unknown is the extent of redundancy and robustness of this system. It is not thought that
185Blair. p. 88. See also Martin Dewing, 57.
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Ukraine has yet deployed any indigenous communications satellites. Instead. Vladimir
Pikaev believes that Ukraine is renting satellite time from Russian satellites.186 If this is
so, then Russia controls one aspect of Ukrainian communications and other redundancy
efforts, such as fiber-optic cable, are unknown at this time. Even though Ukraine
probably has the capability to fashion multiple and secure communication linkages, there
is no evidence to support their existence at this time.
The second issue it that of early warning and intelligence alerting systems.
Large radar sites similar to U.S. ballistic missile early warning (BMEW's) have not been
built and reconnaissance satellites have not boen deployed. Like the South Asian model,
Ukraine appears to lack sophisticated systems to cue its nuclear forces.
The third hardware issue is whether Ukrainian command centers are sufficiently
protected against sabotage and military strike, whether conventional or nuclear. William
Kincade postulates that Ukraine could become a viable nuclear power only if it can
develop systems "as invulnerable as possible to internal or external interference."' 187
Hardened C2 bunkers are technologically within Ukraine's capability but Kincade calls it
"Ifeconomically taxing...for which few resources are available in Ukraine."188 Kincade's
evidence most likely concerns facilities around Kiev because the Soviets in general
spared no expense in hardening key C2 nodes. The Command Center in Vinnitsya
clearly qualifies as such a node. therefore it may be postulated that key governmental
leaders in Kiev lack adequate security but that the military's main nuclear weapons
headquarters at Vinnitsya is secure.
186 Pikaev, interview. 4 Mar 1994.
187 Kincade, p. 14.
188 lbid. p. 14.
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Another hardware question is one of adequate protection of electronics against
the effects of electro-magnetic pulse (EMP). Paul nracken states that the U.S.
acknowledged the need for EMP hardening only in the mature phase (1968 on) of the
evolution of its C2 system. 189 Due to the enormous size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and
attendant C2 system, EMP hardening is very costly. As with the hardening of command
and intelligence modes, Ukraine possessed the requisite technology to protect key
facilities against harmful EMP effects. Yet the issue in Ukraine is financial, not
technological. While the Former Soviet C2 elements in Ukraine are likely to be EMP
hardened, any new C2 structures the Ukrainians construct will require hardening. It is
doubtful that Ukraine can afford to devote its extremely scarce national resources to EMP
protection at this time. 190
A final hardware issue pertains to technical safeguards on the nuclear warheads
themselves. The warheads on the inherited ICBM's are believed to have use-control
devices installed. 191 Whether such safeguards as PALs or ESDs exist on Soviet cruise
missiles or gravity bombs is less clear. 192 If Ukraine has, or will, gain the ability to
deploy a cruise missile warhead or a gravity bomb, or construct one using indigenous
technology, safeguards would have to be installed by the Ukrainians. Such technical
expertise also exists in Ukraine. As use-control and warhead safe-arm devices were
widely used by the Soviets, it follows from Ukraine's Soviet heritage of central control
that they would install these devices on Ukrainian-produced weapons. Once again
189 Bracken, p. 219.
190 Ukraine is unable to pay for its basic energy needs at this time. See Jane Perlez. "Economic Collapse
Leaves Ukraine Little to Trade but its Weapons," N'w York Times, 13 January 1994, p. A6.
191 Blair, p. 100.
192 Ibid, p. 101, 103.
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however, Ukraine may believe that this is one more area of nuclear operations that can be
(at least temporarily) avoided to cut costs.
2. Software Concerns.
C2 software concerns are essentially issue of procedure. Peter Feaver claims
that while hardware measures such as PALs technology are good steps to take to ensure
weapon safety and security, they are useless if the authorization codes are "posted
prominently on the outside of each weapon." 193 While this is an extreme and unlikely
example, the point is clear. Other procedural vulnerabilities may be equally counter-
productive and destabilizing, but much less obvious.
The first item on the procedural side of the "checklist for stable C2" to be
applied to Ukraine is personal reliability screening. Under Ukrainian administrative
control, nuclear forces would be comprised only of personnel who had sworn allegiance
to Ukraine.1 94 From Ukraine's perspective, this is a strong step towards troop loyalty to
Kiev and not Moscow. Personnel reliability screening, however, is more involved. It
includes medical and psychological profiling plus in-depth personal background checks
to ensure that individuals who handle and deploy nuclear weapons are free on anything
which could adversely effect their abilities to follow orders or function normally around
nuclear weapons. 195 While this is standard procedure in the U.S., it is unknown whether
this type of screen was conducted in the Soviet Union or to what extent.196 The lack of a
193 Feaver, p. 166.
194 RFE-RL Research Report I, No. 24 (12 June 1992): 45.
195 Examples include checks for susceptibility to mental disorders (depression. paranoia) and financial
standing (large personal debts could lead to vulnerability to bribery).
196 The CIA is concerned that Russia is unable to control scientists leaving the country as no central data
system exists on citizens who hold top security clearances to possess state secrets. Jane's Defense Weekly,
Vol. 20, No. 20, 13 November 1993. p. 23.
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Russian central data system on personnel holding security clearances may be an
indication that personnel reliability screening is not conducted systematically either. If
this procedural safeguard is lacking in Russia, it is doubtful that it is in place in Ukraine,
a state with relatively limited independent experience with nuclear operations.
Another software issue is that of multi-person control Typically referred to a
"two-man control, the procedure's aim is to prevent any one individual solitary access to
full control over nuclear weapons. Multi-person control therefore is a procedure that
must be instituted at every step of the nuclear weapon process: from manufacture, to
shipment, to storage, to use. Multi-person control is central to U.S. And Soviet (now
Russian) C2 systems. 197 Vladimir Pikaev is unsure about the extent of use of this
procedure is Ukraine. 198 During these unsteady times, Pikaev recommends four-man
control.
Conducting nuclear C2 drills and exercises is a different aspect of procedure.
Routine exercises of the C2 system work to insure not only that the hardware is
operational, hence reliable, but also that those operating it are proficient. Systems and
organizations often appear logical in theory or on paper, but it is not until tension is
placed on them that weak links or fractures become apparent. Fractures in nuclear C2
structures can seriously erode stability. At the present time, Ukraine is continuing to
transfer its nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantlement. It is unlikely that nuclear C2
exercises, however covert, would take place until the transfers are complete. 199
197 Blair, p. 90.
198 Interview, 14 May 1994.
199 During the transfers Russians. and other international observers, are in Ukraine, close to C2 nodes.
The Ukrainians would thus be extremely cautious about permitting outsiders to see any aspect of their C2
structure.
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Lastly on the "checklist for stable C2" is an item that could fall under the
category of either hardware or software: a "learning" mechanism. A learning mechanism
is some organization which would monitor nuclear operations, particularly exercises, to
watch for weak links or fractures in the system. Ukraine has a state nuclear regulatory
agency, the Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation Safety. but it has little
authority over civilian nuclear power operations and even less over military
operations.20o
3. Implications For Stability
This section will recap the item on the "checklist for stable C2" applied to
Ukraine as a test case and discuss the implications each item could have on stability.
The first item is that of redundant and robust communications between
Ukrainian national command authority and the nuclear forces. While communications
exists, it is not redundant or robust. thus, it is vulnerable to strike or sabotage. As
pointed out earlier, should communications go out during a time of crisis, a lower-
echelon commander might be inclined to "use-or-lose" his weapon. This clearly would
lead to retaliation, it has an adverse effect upon stability.
The second item is early warning and intelligence alerting systems. Ukraine
seems to lack those systems. As a result, NCA in Kiev is likely to feel very "blind" to
events outside of Ukraine and may adopt the aggressive "use-it-or-lose-it" posture.
Should tensions rise, Kiev again might want to maintain an aggressive posture. this could
lead to a fail "deadly" situation that would drastically effect stability.
The third "checklist" item is command center protection. It appears that the
central C2 center at Vinnitsya, as well as nuclear weapons depots and missile silos are
200 Comments by Nicoli Steinberg, Director, Ukrainian State Committee for Nuclear and Radiation
Safety, at a seminar. "Nuclear Safety in the CIS: The Regulatory Evolution," in Monterey, California. 12-
13 April 1994.
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hardened against attack. It is less obvious that C2 centers in Kiev exist or if they do. they
are probably not hardened against nuclear blast or sabotage. If this is the case. then
should Ukraine suffer either a conventional or nuclear strike by Russia. the civilian
leadership would likely be isolated or destroyed, while the military could still possibly
deploy weapons. Should Russia even attempt to cut communications from Kiev to
Vinnitsya, for instance, this could trigger a deployment of weapons if the military feared
decapitation. Such action would be destabilizing.
Similarly, Ukraine has probably not hardened much of its C2 infrastructure in
Kiev. While the military command structures might resist the effects of EMP, civilian
centers would likely be knocked out. With civilian leadership paralyzed by the effects of
EMP, the military once again would have sole authority over the nuclear weapons and
may feel inclined to use theril. 20 1
In the realm of technical safeguards, Ukraine would probably feel inclined to
install them on any weapon they would produce indigenously due to their heritage of C2
centralization and due to the large number of ethnic Russians which suffuse Ukrainian
society. Ukrainian NCA would not want Russian agents to be able to deploy or detonate
a weapon in place as possible rationale for Russian retaliation. Such technical safeguards
would have a positive effect on stability.
In terms of procedures, Ukraine does not appear to have a personnel reliability
screening program in place. As a result, there is no objective basis for selection of
personnel to work within the nuclear C2 system. In this case there exists the possibility
that a Ukrainian ultra-nationalist might gain access to the nuclear trigger and seek to pull
20 1This is precisely Pikaev's point. He believes that the Ukrainian Miniter of Defense or his subordinate in
the Center for Administrative Contori of Nuclear Forces has at the present time total control over whatever
Ukraine may have in the way of nuclear weapons. No additional authorization (from the Pime Minister.
President. etc.) is required to release weapons from the TsAUSyAS.
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it in a crisis. This would degrade stability. Similarly, if Ukraine does not utilize the
multi-person control procedure, then weapons are vulnerable to theft, improper
maintenance or again, potential detonation in place, whether intentionally by saboteurs or
accidentally through careless practice. Either way stability would be in jeopardy.
Ukraine may not be ready to conduct nuclear exercises at the present time, due
either to concern over secrecy during implementation of the conditions of the Trilateral
Statement, or because the nuclear option has not been exercised. If a nuclear system is
developed, then exercises would serve to streamline it so that it would be less likely to
fail under stress.
"Learning mechanisms" also do not seem to exist in Ukraine. As a result, old
lessons would have to be relearned, possibly at great financial or ecological cost. This
situation is destabilizing. However, Ukraine, like many new nuclear states, does possess
technical research centers and universities. Think tanks from within these institutions
could be developed to advise the government and the midlitary on issues of safe and secure
nuclear operations. This would serve the interests of stability.
E. CONCLUSION
The "checklist for stable C2" has revealed that there exist numerous vulnerabilities in
Ukraine's existing or future nuclear C2 structure. While some may be addressed over
time, most are issues which Ukraine seems ill-equipped to rectify in the short-term. As a
result, Ukraine's C2 system is likely to fail. It is also most likely to fail "deadly" with
dramatic, adverse effects upon regional and international stability.
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V: CONCLUSION
Despite the best efforts to thwart nuclear weapons proliferation, new nuclear states
are appearing. Some, such as North Korea, are impacting the world community at the
present time. Potential nuclear weapons states such as Libya, Iraq and Iran, may emerge
later on to threaten the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Whether one is a proliferation
pessimist or a deterrence optimist, it appears that some nuclear proliferation is inevitable.
This thesis has attempted to demonstrate that regardless of the merits of the arguments of
ether pessimists or optimists, a new nuclear state's contribution to regional or
international stability rests more upon the nuclear C2 system itself than on the weapons it
possesses.
A. C2 IS THE CENTERPIECE FOR STABILITY
Proliferation pessimists contend that irresponsible despots in new nuclear states may
gain control over nuclear weapons and use them without regard for the human and
environmental consequences. Deterrence optimists counter that the enormous destructive
power of nuclear weapons would hold in check ever the most aggressive state leader, so
long as even a slim chance for nuclear retaliation existed. Pessimists might then say that
while state leaders may be conscientious about nuclear use, lower-echelon commanders
might not be. They might argue that the more nuclear weapon capable states that exist,
the greater the likelihood for a nuclear accident which would yield catastrophic
implications for stability. Optimists would rebut this with the argument that any nuclear
state would take whatever precautions necessary to insure the safety of such extremely
valuable nuclear weapons.
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At the heart of this argument is the C2 system. It has three primary functions: to
make nuclear weapons reliable, to make them safe and to keep them secure. If these
goals could be adequately met, then the vast majority of proliferation pessimists' concerns
would be resolved and stable nuclear deterrence would abound. Unfortunately the proper
balance between reliability, safety and security is difficult, if not impossible to achieve.
This is true of the avowed nuclear weapon states; it is even more profound in new or
potential nuclear states. New nuclear states are not likely to have either the resources or
the experience to achieve a near balance of these goals. As a result, the nuclear C2
systems will be out of balance and are likely to fail. Systems are likely to fail "safely" or
"deadly." This is dependent upon whether the system itself has been developed to
emphasize safety and security, or reliability, respectively.
B. ANALYTICAL TOOLS ARE REQUIRED
This thesis has proposed that analytical tools are required to determine the likely C2
structures, vulnerabilities and failure modes of C2 systems in new nuclear states. Since
information is generally unattainable to answer these questions directly, a general
framework was developed which can predict how a C2 system in a new nuclear state
might function. Based on a set of determinants which effect any new nuclear state, the
"framework for C2 development" reveals a system's proclivity to be either centralized or
de-centralized. Centralized, or assertive C2 systems are more likely to fail "safely" while
de-centralized ones are prone to fail "deadly."
While such information is useful to those who are concerned with the attendant
effects upon stability that "safe" and "deadly" C2 failures have, what has been lacking in
the literature is an analytical device which allows researchers to go beyond general C2
outlines. This thesis has proposed a "checklist for stable C2" which enhances
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investigation of specific C2 vulnerabilities which might lead to a system's failure with
adverse effects upon regional and international stability.
C. CASE STUDY APPLICATION
To determine how a new nuclear state's C2 system could effect stability, the
"framework for C2 development" and the "checklist for stable C2" were applied to
Ukraine. Faced with limited economic resources and a powerful regional rival. Ukraine
is an ideal candidate to pursue an independent nuclear weapons capability. In this way
Ukraine is a good case study. Should Ukraine obtain nuclear weapons, it, like any new
nuclear state, would have obtained a de facto C2 system as well, whether any
consideration had been given it or not. The "framework" revealed that Ukraine was more
likely to have a decentralized C2 system with limited safeguards and procedures. This
indicates that should Ukraine's C2 system fail, it is likely to fail "deadly." The
"checklist" confirmed this finding by identifying several more specific C2 vulrrabilities
that could lead to "deadly" failures.
D. IMPLICATIONS OR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
This thesis has revealed that the implications of C2 failures for strategic stability is
dramatic. It may be difficult to determine which argument has more merit, that of the
proliferation pessimist or that of the deterrence optimist. It is not, however, difficult to
identify the best interests of the United States: regional and international stability
between states. The issue is how to achieve this. The more states around the world that
are capable of promoting stability on their own, the better for the U.S. In this way the
U.S. is not forced to play the thankless role of global policeman. Instead it can focus its
energies and increasingly scarce resources on domestic and economic concerns.
If nuclear non-proliferation efforts are effective at promoting regional and
international stability, which is in the best interests of the U.S., then these efforts should
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be supported. Yet if non-proliferation efforts are stalled or ineffective, then alternatives
should be considered. Although not novel to this thesis, technical and procedural
assistance in the area of nuclear operations is such an alternative.
The U.S. should adopt a two-track approach to nuclear non-proliferation. First it
should continue efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to potential nuclear states.
Second, however, it should identify those new nuclear states which may have C2 systems
which have the proclivity to fail "deadly" and degrade stability. Once such states are
identified, the U.S. should take bold steps to provide basic technological and procedural
safeguards to bolster the safety and security of these states' nuclear weapons. This would
decrease the likelihood for a nuclear accident or inadvertent use during the near-term,
while longer-term non-proliferation efforts continue. In this way the best interests of all
states, both nuclear and otherwise, are served by limiting the likelihood of a nuclear
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